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Introduction
The population of Niamey, the capital city of the West African Republic of Niger, is

exploding.1 Since urban residents need houses, large tracts of peri-urban2 land around the city
are being transformed from fields to suburbs.3 This land transformation is being accompanied
by a legal transformation from customary to formal state law.4 As is true of most legal
transformations, this one is producing winners and losers.5 The winners are those with access to
financial, political, and social capital who use their superior strength to take advantage of the
new rules.6 The losers are the peasant farmers and their families who are uprooted from their
traditions and their main sources of livelihood.7
Under customary law in rural Niger, land is inextricably interwoven with history, identity,
and religion.8 One’s access to land depends on membership and good standing in a family, a

1

Hamadou Issaka, La Promotion Immoblière Informelle a Niamey: L’Irregularite Comme Reponse a la Crise du
Logement, URBANITES (Nov. 8, 2013), available at http://www.revue-urbanites.fr/la-promotion-immobiliereinformelle-a- niamey-lirregularite-comme-reponse-a-la-crise-du-logement/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (arguing
Niamey has undergone vertiginous growth); see The World Factbook (Niger) (People and Society), U.S. CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html
(last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (estimating Niger's rate of urbanization as 4.27% for 2015-2020, ranking 11th for
highest urbanization rate in the world).
2
There is no universally accepted definition of the term peri-urban. Beacon Mbiba & Marie Huchzeremey,
Contentious Development: Peri-Urban Studies in Sub-Saharan Africa, PROGRESS IN DEV. STUD. 113, 114 (2002).
However, it generally refers to land around the periphery of urban areas that includes elements of both rural and
urban use and where farmland is being converted to suburbs. See Achamyeleh Gashu Adam, Land Tenure in the
Changing Peri-Urban Areas of Ethiopia: The Case of Bahir Dar City, INT’L J. OF URB. & REGIONAL RES. 1970,
1970- 1971 (2014) (arguing peri-urban lands are places just outside municipal boundaries where urban and rural
coexist and where farmland is being converted to suburban house plots); Janine Ubink, Traditional Authority
Revisited: Popular Perceptions of Chiefs and Chieftaincy in Peri-Urban Ghana, J. LEGAL PLURALISM &
UNOFFICIAL L. 123, 129 (2007) (defining peri-urban as “approximating a continuum from rural to urban”); See
also IGNASIO MALIZANI JIMU, EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND RELATIONS IN PERI-URBAN BLANTYRE, MALAWAI 69
(2012) (arguing peri-urban land is usually characterized by “the encroachment of the expanding urban area onto the
surrounding rural land . . . affecting the livelihood of small farmers” and where land goes from rural to urban and
from customary to statutory tenure).
3
See infra Part IV.D
4
See JIMU, supra note 2, at 69.
5
See infra notes 276-78 and accompanying text (arguing elites in developing countries always benefit from changes in
the law).
6
See infra Part V.A.
7
See infra Part V.B.
8
See Thomas Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets into Pigeon Holes: The Effects of Globalization and State Legal Reform in
Niger on Indigenous Zarma Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL.635, 680-691 (2002) (arguing land in Nigerien villages
is closely connected to spiritual beliefs, history, and community identity); see see also PARKER SHIPTON, MORTGAGING
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lineage group, and a village.9 At the same time, land helps define those institutions.10 Villagers
explain themselves, their family histories, and the linkages between families by recounting
stories of ancestors who founded their villages, usually by clearing the land for agricultural
use.11 All males who descend from the original, land-clearing ancestors can claim membership
in the lineage and thus present-day access to land.12
Rural land in Niger is also intertwined with spiritual beliefs. Land helps bind together the
temporal and spiritual worlds.13 Villages are surrounded by all manner of spirits including the
black spirits (gangi bi) who controlled the land before humans arrived, and the spirits of
ancestors who made pacts with the gangi bi that permitted them to inhabit and exploit the land.14
Those spirits intervene in the daily lives of rural people, sometimes helping them, sometimes
harming them.15
Rural Nigerien people who lose their land as a result of urbanization lose their
connections to these powerful practical and symbolic touchstones that bring order and meaning
to their lives, but that is not all they lose. Because most rural Nigeriens rely on subsistence
farming, many will also lose their livelihoods.16 In Niger, there is no equivalent of Detroit or

THE ANCESTORS: IDEOLOGIES OF ATTACHMENT IN AFRICA 117 (2009) (arguing land is tightly tied up with social
position and also with “the most intimate, emotionally charged dimensions of personhood and pride”).
9
Thomas Kelley, Unintended Consequences of Legal Westernization in Niger: Harming Contemporary Slaves by
Reconceptualizing Property, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 999, 1006-07; Parker Shipton & Mitzi Goheen, Understanding
African Land-Holding: Power, Wealth, and Meaning, 62 AFR. J. OF THE INT’L AFR. INST. 307, 307 (1992) (arguing
land in Africa helps “define personal and social identities”); see SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 110 (arguing in East
Africa, people belong to their land).
10
See Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 663 (describing a Nigerien village that traces its history to a group of
brothers who dug a well and cleared the bush around it).
11
Id.
12
Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1006-08.
13
See id. at 1007 (arguing Nigerien traditional leaders ensure land is used in ways approved by the spirits).
14
See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
15
Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 647-48; Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 107.
16
The World Factbook (Niger) (People and Society), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY , available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019); see U.N. Exec.
Bd. of the U. N. Dev. Programme, the U. N. Population Fund and the U. N. Off. for Project Servs., Country
Programme Document for Niger (2019-2021), ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. GEN/N18/393/74/N1839374 (Nov. 21, 2018) (arguing
that a large part of the Nigereian population is dependent on subsistence farming).
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Pittsburg where displaced agricultural workers can find wage labor,17 so many will simply
starve.18
This paper explores Niger’s peri-urban transition in land use and law. Part II provides
background on Niger with an emphasis on the demographics that explain why the country is
facing a potentially cataclysmic if slow-moving land crisis. Part III will indulge in a step often
skipped by legal scholars and development practitioners: it will explore in some detail the
customary law that governs land use in rural areas. Without understanding customary law, one
cannot understand the enormity of the loss that will result when fields become suburbs. Part IV
will shift the lens to the city and describe the legal and political context that has permitted
Niamey’s explosive and largely unregulated growth. It notes that when formal state law and
customary law bump into one another in peri-urban areas, formal law almost always prevails: the
land is irrevocably transformed from a key element of a social, historical, and spiritual complex,
into a commodity. Part V describes in detail who wins and who loses as a result of the
transformation. The paper concludes that the wealthy and well-connected win, while peasant
farmers lose. They lose their livelihoods and, just as important, the customary law that has
sustained their communities through centuries of adversity.
II.

About Niger
Niger is among the poorest, least developed countries in the world.19 One reason is its

17

See Interview with Hamdallaye Canton Chief, in Hamdallaye, Republic of Niger (May 1, 2018) (arguing “[i]f
peasant farmers sell their land, what will they do? It’s not as if there are factories in the city where they can go find
jobs”); see also SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 33 (arguing that in the U.S. urban employment cushioned the blow from
rural land dispossession but that in Africa no such safety net exists).
18
See infra Part V.B.2.a (describing the livelihood effects of rural Nigeriens losing access to agricultural land).
19
Human Development Reports: Human Development Data (1990-2017), U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/data (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (ranking Niger as the poorest country in the world out of all 189
countries listed); The World Factbook (Niger) (Introduction), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY , available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) ("Niger is one of
the poorest countries in the world with minimal government services and insufficient funds to develop its resource
base, and is ranked last in the world on the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index.").
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paucity of natural resources.20 It is landlocked and two-thirds of its surface is located in the
parched Sahara Desert,21 a zone unsuitable for agricultural production.22 The southern third of
the country, where most of the population lives,23 is only marginally more fecund.24 The soils
there tend to be sandy and of poor quality,25watercourses are rare, and rainfall, upon which most
farmers depend,26 is sparse and variable.27 These challenging geographic and climatic realities
are troubling in a country where most peoples’ livelihood depends on agriculture.28

20

Although Niger’s land is unproductive, it is not completely bereft of natural resources. The World Factbook (Niger)
(Geography), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (listing Niger's natural resources as uranium, coal, iron ore, tin,
phosphates, gold, molybdenum, gypsum, salt, and petroleum). It has significant uranium deposits in its northern
mountains, the proceeds of which led to a minor economic boom in the 1970s. Ursula Meyer, Negocier l’acces, la
propriete et l’autorité publique en marge de la ville. Enjeux foncier a Niamey et production d’Etat au Niger 108 (2016)
(doctoral thesis presented to the Faculty of Geosciences and the Environment, Universitiy of Lausanne) (on file with
author). But uranium prices dropped in the 1980s as nuclear power fell out of favor in the developed world, and the
mines have done little to lift Niger out of poverty. Gabriella Korling, In Search of the State, An Ethnography of Public
Service Provision in Urban Niger 58 (2011) (doctoral dissertation in Cultural Anthropology, Uppsala Universitet in
Sweden) (arguing uranium prices fell in the late 1970s). More recently, petroleum deposits have been identified in
northeastern Niger. The World Factbook (Niger), supra note 1; Meyer, supra note 20, at 120 (referring to a recent
increase in mining and oil extraction).
21
U.N. Int'l Human Rights Instruments, Common Core Document Forming Part of the Reports of States Parties: the
Niger, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. GEN/G18/075/27/G1807527 (May 22, 2018) ("Located in the eastern part of western Africa, the
Niger is a landlocked country with a surface area of 1,267,000 km2. Two thirds of the national territory is in the
Saharan zone."); The World Factbook (Niger) (Geography), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) ("[L]andlocked;
one of the hottest countries in the world; northern four-fifths is desert, southern one-fifth is savanna, suitable for
livestock and limited agriculture[.]"); Meyer, supra note 20, at 91.
22
Common Core, supra note 21, ¶ 1.
23
The World Factbook (Niger) (Geography), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) ("[M]ajority of
the populace is located in the southernmost extreme of the country along the border with Nigeria and Benin[.]");
Meyer, supra note 20, at 91 (arguing 80% of Niger’s population lives in the southern third of the country).
24
The World Factbook (Niger) (Geography), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (reporting that
only 12.3% of Niger's land is "arable").
25
Irahimn Yahaya Ibrahim, Niger in the Face of the Sahelo-Saharan Islamic Insurgency: Precarious Stability in a
Troubled Neighborhood5 (Sahel Research Group, Working Paper No. 004, 2014).
26
The World Factbook (Niger) (Geography), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (reporting that
Niger has only 300km of waterways, ranking 93 out of 107 countries listed); Florence Bron-Saidatou, La Gouvernance
Fonciere au Niger: Malgre des Acquis, de Nombreuses Difficultes 6 (2015) (working paper produced by a coalition of
French Development Agencies).
27
Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 6; see Ambe J. Njoh, The Role and Goals of the State in Urban Development in
Niger, 30 HABITAT INT’L 540, 545 (2006) (referring to Niger’s “low rainfall”).
28
The World Factbook: Africa (Niger), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (arguing that
agriculture provides a livelihood for more than 80% of Niger's population).
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Approximately 85% of Niger’s population engages in agricultural work and most people

depend, at least in part, on subsistence farming for their food.29 Irrigation is rare, so rainfed
agriculture is vital to peoples’ survival; however, climate change is resulting in a shrinking of
Niger’s rainy season, cutting further into agricultural productivity.30 Due to decreasing yields,
most households supplement their livelihood by engaging in animal husbandry,31 wage labor, and
informal small business activity.32
Niger’s deteriorating agricultural conditions are particularly alarming when one considers
how many mouths there are to feed. The country’s population growth rate is the highest in the
world at 3.9%.33 In the early 1960s, around the time of Niger’s independence from France, Niger
had approximately 4.3 million inhabitants.34 By 2012, the population had expanded to 17
million.35 Estimates put the current population at over 20 million36 and, if the growth trends
continue, 33 million by 2030.37
The converging trends of land degradation and population growth means that many
more people, almost all of whom need arable land to feed themselves, must crowd onto ever-

29

The World Factbook (Niger) (People and Society), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019); see
Country Programme, supra note 16 (arguing that a large part of the Nigereian population is dependent on
subsistence farming).
30
The World Factbook: Africa (Niger), supra note 29 (arguing that rainfall in Niger is declining); Bron-Saidatou,
supra note 26, at 8.
31
Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 6 (arguing 43.2% of Niger’s population engages in animal husbandry).
32
See The World Bank, Republic of Niger Priorities for Ending Poverty and Boosting Shared Prosperity Systematic
Country Diagnostic, 12, Report No. 115661-NE (Nov. 28, 2017).
33
The World Factbook: Africa (Niger), supra, note 29 ("Niger has the highest total fertility rate (TFR) of any
country in the world, averaging close to 7 children per woman in 2016."); Exec. Bd. of the U. N. Dev. Programme,
the U. N. Population Fund and the U. N. Off. for Project Servs., U.N. Population Fund Country Programme
Document for Niger, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. DP/FPA/CPD/NER/9 (Nov. 27, 2018) ("Niger’s annual demographic growth rate
is the highest in the world, at 3.9 per cent; its population, currently 17,138,707, will double every 18 years."); The
World Bank, supra note 32, at ¶ 52 (arguing at present, an average Nigerien woman experiences 7.3 live births
during her lifetime).
34
Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 4.
35
Id.
36
Niger, THE WORLD BANK, available at https://data.worldbank.org/country/niger?view=chart (last visited Sept. 27,
2019) (reporting Niger's population as 21,602,472 in 2017); Country Programme, supra note 16, ¶ 1 (estimating
Niger's population at 21,466,862 as of 2017).
37
See The World Bank, supra note 36.
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smaller fields upon which less and less rain is falling.38 The overcrowding, in turn, exacerbates
problems with soil fertility. As the expanding population seeks to feed itself by planting evermore staple crops, the amount of fallow land decreases, further diminishing the fields’
productive capacity.39 The end result is that contemporary Niger experiences periodic acute
food crises and 16.7% of children under the age of 5 are chronically malnourished.40
Rapid, poorly planned and poorly regulated urbanization is exacerbating the crisis in
rural land and livelihoods.41 Although Niger is still a predominantly rural society, its rate of
urbanization is among the highest in the world.42 The challenging demographic and climatic
conditions described in preceding paragraphs are driving the rural population –particularly
young men43 – towards the city.44 Further, the lure of the city has been enhanced by the rise of
economic liberalization and structural adjustment policies, which have compelled the Nigerien
state to withdraw much of its healthcare, education, and infrastructure investment from rural
areas.45 Combined, these factors have led to sizzling growth in Niamey’s population.46

38

The World Factbook: Africa (Niger), supra note 29; see also Interview with Niamey, Former Resident of Goudel,
in Republic of Niger (Apr. 30, 2018) (arguing the shrinking rainy season will no longer support the best strains of
millet, Niger’s staple crop).
39
Country Programme, supra note 16, ¶ 5 ("Niger’s challenges also result from population pressure, the adverse
effects of climate change, inadequate agricultural practices and resulting land degradation."); Bron-Saidatou, supra
note 26, at 8 (arguing population pressure is leading to shorter fallow periods and the overall degradation of soils);
Interview with Niamey, Judge, Republic of Niger (May 9, 2018) (arguing that due to population pressure it is no longer
possible to let land lie fallow so that it is overcultivated); see generally Hamdallaye, supra note 17 (arguing there is
“enormous pressure on land” in Niger).
40
The World Bank, supra note 32, ¶ 152 ("[B]eing malnourished is almost normal (44 percent of children [are]
stunted)[.]"); see Ibrahim, supra note 25, at 5 (arguing acute malnutrition touches 16.7% of Inger’s children under
5).
41
Meyer, supra note 20, at 90 (arguing rural land loss is causing Nigeriens to seek refuge in cities); see infra notes
259-260 and accompanying text (arguing urban expansion in Niger is guided by private interests and poorly regulated).
42
See The World Factbook (Niger) (People and Society), U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (estimating
Niger's rate of urbanization as 4.27% for 2015-2020, which ranks 11th for highest urbanization rate in the world).
43
See THE WORLD BANK, REPUBLIC OF NIGER: PRIORITIES FOR ENDING POVERTY AND BOOSTING SHARED
PROSPERITY: SYSTEMATIC COUNTRY DIAGNOSTIC ¶ 40 (Report No. 115661-NE) (2017).
44
Issaka, supra note 1 (arguing thousands of rural citizens seek a better life in Niamey every year and most have no
qualifications); Meyer, supra note 20, at 103, 105 (arguing Niger sees spikes in urban population growth at times of
famine).
45
Meyer, note 20, at 110; see Körling, supra note 20, at 21 (arguing Niamey is privileged over rural areas in both
health and education).
46
Issaka, supra note 1.
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Specifically, in 1977, the capital counted 243,000 residents; by 2000, the number was 650,000;
today, estimates run as high as 1.5 million.47 Because all of these new arrivals need shelter, and
because most residential construction in Niger is in the form of one-story,48 metal-roofed, mud
and cement houses surrounded by small walled compounds,49 the city is gobbling up large
swaths of agricultural land each year and irreversibly converting it into suburban house plots.50
In sum, Niger is in the midst of a vicious cycle. Due largely to demographic and climatic
pressures on agricultural land, ever more people are seeking sustenance in the city. As the city
grows, it devours the agricultural land that is the main source of food – even if an increasingly
feeble one – for Nigeriens who remain in rural communities. As the following sections will
demonstrate, when real estate developers and investors convert fields to suburbs, rural people
lose not only their source of food but their way of life: a social and spiritual identity that is
rooted in, and to large extent defined by, land.
III.
Existing Customary Land Law in Rural Niger51
Customary land law has been remarkably resilient in Niger.52 In spite of numerous attempts
by Niger’s government during the 20th and 21st centuries to weaken or eliminate it,53 most of
47

Körling supra note 20, at 77; Common Core, supra note 21, Table 1 (reporting Niamey's population as 397,437 in
1988, 725,030 in 2001, and 1,011,277 in 2012); see The World Factbook: Africa (Niger), supra note 29 (estimating
Niamey's population at 1.214 million in 2018).
48
See Henri Kokou Motcho, Urbanisation et Role de la Chefferie Traditionnelle dans la Communaute Urbaine de
Niamey, 229 LES CAHIERS D’OUTRE-MER, REVUE DE GEOGRAPHIE DE BORDEAUX 73, 74 (2005) (arguing that
Niamey’s expansion has included few multi-story buildings).
49
See id. at 2 (arguing housing density is low in Niamey because most structures are single-story).
50
See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
51
Custom in Africa is a contested and controversial construct. Scholars generally reject the idea that custom was a
static, self-contained body of pristine norms that existed in pre-colonial times. Sara Berry, Privatization and the
Politics of Belonging in West Africa, in LAND AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING IN WEST AFRICA 241, 245
(Richard Kuba & Carola Lentz eds., 2013). Instead, they view custom as endlessly dynamic and in recent centuries
developed “through interactions between colonial officials and their subjects, each drawing selectively on historical
precedents to influence one another and make the best of changing circumstances.” Id. Colonial governments made
attempts to define, and at times manipulate, custom in ways that supported the state’s authority. Squeezing Parakeets,
supra note 8, at 652-55. But colonial and post-colonial states rarely succeeded in inventing custom from whole cloth
and “have often exercised little real control of it.” Shipton & Goheen, supra note 9, at 308.
52
See Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 656-57; Thomas Kelley, Apples to Oranges: Epistemological Dissonance
in the Human Rights Case Hadijatou Mani v. Niger, 32 QUINNIPIAC U. L. REV. 311, 336-37 (2014).
53
See Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 11-12 (arguing the Nigerien state passed several laws intended to limit
traditional leaders’ authority over land); Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 658, n. 105-06 (arguing Niger’s postindependence government passed laws aimed and curbing chiefs’ authority over land, all to little effect).
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Niger’s rural land is still governed by it.54 From the perspective of a western-trained lawyer it can
be diffuse and confusing,55 but it must be grappled with if one is to understand the profound legal,
social, and spiritual transformation the country is undergoing as urban areas encroach on farm
land. The following discussion will introduce a somewhat idealized, archetypal version of
customary land law before showing how it has been affected by colonialism, the rise of orthodox
Islam, and the pervading influence of globalization and economic liberalism.
A. The Customary Law Archetype
Descriptions of customary land law in Niger tend toward static, archetypal accounts56
when in fact it is dynamic, variable, and often messy.57 Still, the archetype is one that rural
Nigeriens recount, sometimes wistfully, when discussing their communities’ historic relationship
to land.58 Thus, even if it does not provide a perfectly accurate history of customary land law, it
reveals much about rural peoples’ collective memory and values concerning land.59
In rural Nigerien villages, the most enduring and powerful land rights are those of firstcomers.60 Every village has a founding story, often involving brothers or male cousins who left

54

Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 659-60 (arguing most rural people in Niger base land claims on custom and
often have no knowledge and no desire to know what formal state law would say about the matter).
55
Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1008.
56
See Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 653 (arguing the French colonialists in Niger attempted to explain
customary law in terms of fixed rules).
57
See Janine M. Ubink, Tenure Security: Wishful Policy Thinking or Reality? A Case from Peri-Urban Ghana, 51 J.
Afr. L. 215, 231 (2007) (arguing customary law in Ghana is “fluid, relational and negotiable” and “constantly
recreated and disputed); SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 230 (arguing Kenyan customary land law is endlessly dynamic);
Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1006 (referring to Niger’s land use customs as “evolving, fluid, and
negotiable”).
58
Interview with Village Chief in Gassangourni, Republic of Niger (May 18, 2000) and Interview with Yaye Issa and
Issafou Lali (May 22, 1996); Interview with Group of Villagers (ne 1, 1996); Interview with Group of Villagers in
Fandou-Berri, Republic of Niger (May 17, 2000 (morning)).
59
See id.
60
Richard Kuba, Spiritual Hierarchies and Unholy Alliances: Competing Earth Priests in a Context of Migration in
Southwestern Burkina Faso, in LAND AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING IN WEST AFRICA 57, 60 (Richard Kuba &
Carola Lentz eds., 2006) (arguing in a West African context that land rights arise from first-comers who made pacts
with local deities); Sten Hagberg, Money, Ritual and the Politics of Belonging in Land Transactions in Western
Burkina Faso, in LAND AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING IN WEST AFRICA 99, 103 (Richard Kuba & Carola Lentz
eds., 2006) (referring to the oldest male descendant establishing land rights by forming an original pact with the
spirits); Meyer, supra note 20, at 125 (arguing Niger’s land law is based largely on “rights of the first to clear”).
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their natal village in search of adventure or due to a rift within their lineage.61 In some accounts,
the men began by capturing slaves and forcing them to dig a well.62 The well became the
symbolic and practical center of the new village.63 Starting from the circumference of the well,
the founders traced pie-shaped lots of land that stretched indefinitely into the surrounding
bush.64 Nobody paid close attention to the claims’ outer boundaries because land was an
inexhaustible resource.65 Over time, men would solidify their claims to land by clearing the
bush and tilling the soil.66 Although there seem not to have been hard and fast rules on the
matter, leaving the land untouched for too long could weaken a claim of access. 67
A father could generally expect that the land he controlled would pass to his sons since
inheritance passed through the male line.68 The family land would never be formally divided,
but each son would be apportioned a parcel that he would control until he divided it among his
own sons.69 The lineage head, the village chief, the land chief (laabukoy), and the heads of
families within the lineage would decide how the parcels of land would be divided among young
men.70
The first-comers formed alliances with the original black spirits (gangi bi) who inhabited
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See Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 663 (describing the village of Fandou Berri’s founding by a famous
warrior and his brothers who captured slaves and compelled them to dig a well to sustain the village);
62
Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 663 (describing the village of Fandou Berri’s founding by a warrior and his
brothers who captured slaves and compelled them to dig a well to sustain the village); Unintended Consequences,
supra note 9, at 1027 (describing a similar story regarding the village of Saabu Dey).
63
JEAN-PIERRE OLIVIER DE SARDAN, LES SOCIETES SONGHAY-ZARMA (NIGER-MALI) 663 (1984)
(describing the symbolic importance of well digging in Nigerien culture).
64
Interview with Saabu Dey village chief and group of elders, in Saabu Dey, Republic of Niger (December 5, 2003).A
somewhat different version of founders’ land rights, one I have heard only once, involves founders galloping on
horseback, throwing spears into the earth, and vying to knock one another off if there was a disagreement about
boundaries. Interview with Former Resident of Goudel (April 30, 2018). Interview with Niamey, supra note 38.
65
See Meyer, supra note 20, at 125 (arguing agricultural land in Niger was historically abundant and “if a man had
reason he could simply clear land and benefit from its fruits”)
66
Id.
67
Kelley, supra note 9, at 1007; Kelley, supra note 8, at 682, n. 176.
68
Kelley, supra note 8, at 683.
69
Kelley, supra note 8, at 681, n. 175. Typically, young males would work in their father’s fields, and would not be
assigned a separate plot until they married.
70
Kelley, supra note 9, at 1007.
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the bush, and those alliances had to be nurtured and respected by subsequent generations.71
Because the spirit world, like the temporal world, was dynamic and ever changing,72 other
actors also came to inhabit the spiritual realm, including the spirits of villagers’ ancestors.73 If
the spirits were pleased, villagers in the temporal world would prosper in their daily lives.74 The
rains would fall gently and persistently, while locusts and other pestilence would stay away. If
the spirits were displeased, villagers would suffer crop failure, sickness, and death.75
Some members of the community were particularly skillful at understanding and
addressing the spirits’ demands.76 The land chief, often the same person as the village chief,
would ensure that villagers’ use of land would not cause offense.77 In instances where the spirits
had been offended, the community could organize a spirit possession ceremony to communicate
directly between the realms.78 During these ceremonies, spirits would inhabit the bodies of
certain villagers and speak directly to the gathered throng.79 Other villagers, referred to as
zimas, were skilled at summoning the spirits to the temporal world to visit punishments and
rewards upon living people or, conversely, to protect threatened humans from harm.80
Chiefs in Niger historically played – and still play – important roles in determining access

71

See Kelley, supra note 8, at 646.
See id.
73
See id, at 646-47.
74
See id; see also Amadou supra note 61, at 9 (arguing villagers in a Nigerien river village, Karey Kopto, appeal to
the spirits to ensure good fishing, good harvests, and to avoid sickness).
75
Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1007; see Hagberg, supra note 60, at 99 (arguing earth priests
and elders regard the earth “as a divinity and fear that the violation of rituals may endanger not merely the individual’s
well-being but community life in general”).
76
See Amadou, supra note 61, at 3 (describing a village chief in southern Niger who descended directly from village
founders and who therefore had the ability to “remain in permanent contact with the invisible world,” appease the
spirits and protect the village).
77
Kelley, supra note 9, at 1007.
78
Kelley, supra note 8, at 647.
79
I witnessed a spirit possession ceremony in a rural Zarma village in 1987. A powerful storm had blown through the
village destroying crops and several grass huts in which villagers lived. An interlocutor explained that participants
wanted to know why the damage had been unleashed. When I asked whom they were communicating with, they
answered “irikoy,” which translates to “our keeper.” It is the term that most Zarma people use when they referring to
God in the Islamic tradition.
80
See Amadou, supra note 61, at 4 (describing a zima as a priest healer and an ally of the spirits).
72
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to land.81 Typically, only direct descendants of a village’s founders could vie for the position of
village chief.82 Once selected, he had little prescriptive power and instead acted as first among
equals, convening village leaders and lineage heads to form consensus.83 Niger’s history is
replete with efforts by the state – at first the colonial regime, later post-independence
governments – to manipulate, coopt, or diminish the chiefs and their authority.84 The position of
village chief, has, however, endured and today is an intriguing amalgam. Chiefs are rooted in
tradition and considered, at least in many communities, legitimate sources of authority.85 At the
same time, they act as low-level administrators for the state.86 They collect taxes, conciliate local
disputes, and, crucially, endorse land transactions.87
Higher-level regional chiefs, generally referred to as canton chiefs (chefs de canton),88
also exercised influence over land, but they enjoyed less historical legitimacy.89 Cantons were
geographic regional divisions imported to Niger by the French colonizers.90 To aid their
administration of the vast territory (one they had little interest in except its value in blocking
Great Britain’s colonial expansion),91 the French invented chieftaincies to rule over the cantons

81

See Kelley, supra note 9, at 1019; see also Meyers, infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text (arguing rural
people in Niger still prefer to deal with chiefs on matters involving land).
82
See Kelley, supra note 8, at 653; Amadou, supra note 61, at 3 (arguing the chief of a village in southern Niger
represents legitimate authority, that he presides over political and land-related decisions, and that the position of chief
is elected from among descendants of the family of the first occupants).
83
See Kelley, supra note 8, at 653.
84
See Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 11 (arguing the colonial and post-independence governments passed various
laws intended to diminish chiefs’ authority); see also Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 658, n. 106.
85
See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 655 (arguing the position of village chief predated the arrival of
the French and so its legitimacy survived colonialists’ machinations); Abdourahaman Chaibou, Les Judge, Le Cadis,
le Chef et les Autres . . . REVUE JURIDIQUE DE SAMAN 5 (1998) (arguing chiefs in Niger act as both legitimate
traditional leaders and as low-level agents of the modern state).
86
See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 655 (arguing the position of village chief predated the arrival of
the French and so its legitimacy survived colonialists’ machinations); Chaibou, supra note 85, at 5.
87
See infra notes 297-301 and accompanying text.
88
Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 654.
89
Id.
90

Id.
See Meyer, supra note 20, at 97 (arguing the French occupied Niger to prevent the British from expanding
northward from Sokoto (in present-day Nigeria) and to facilitate France’s plans to sweep across the continent from
Dakar to Djibouti); Korling, supra note 20, at 43 (arguing the French’s interest in Niger was political and strategic,
not economic); Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 651-52.
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they had just created.92 In some instances, the canton boundaries were in approximate accord with
the domains of pre-colonial regional chiefs, and the new chefs de canton retained at least some
legitimacy in the eyes of rural people.93 But the French filled many of the chef de canton
positions with their own toadies, including some who were said to come from Niger’s slave class
and therefore lacked legitimate claim to positions of customary leadership.94
Rural Nigeriens strongly prefer to resolve their disputes at the family or lineage levels.95
To involve a chief in a dispute or, worse yet a state institution, is to admit that family patriarchs
have failed in their duties.96 However, where disputes cannot be resolved by lineage heads,
villagers call upon chiefs to conciliate.97 In deciding among competing access claims, chiefs
apply no fixed rules and followed no established procedures.98 Instead, they gather historical
evidence from villagers with the longest memories.99 Whose ancestor cleared the parcel of land
at issue? Did the ancestor give the parcel to another individual, or was it only a loan? Who
planted the fruit trees on edge of the parcel or dug the well, since both these actions are strong
evidence of access rights?100 Having brought that history to light, the chief would steer the
disputants toward a resolution.101 Crucially, the resolution often would take account of the
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Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 654.
Id. at 655.
94
See Meyer, supra note 20, at 103 (arguing the first Canton Chief in Niamey was viewed as a French collaborator).
95
Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 668.
96
Id.
97
Based on many of performing ethnographic research in rural parts of Niger, I can report generally that land disputes
arise for various reasons. Villagers might disagree over which founder laid claim to a particular tract of land, or indeed,
whether a particular ancestor was or was not among the village founders. They might disagree about boundaries
between fields, which typically were (and are) marked by narrow uncultivated strips of land and immovable objects
such as trees. Often, especially in more recent times, village disputes involve disagreement over whether founder’s
lineage gave a field to a late-comer and his descendants (in some instances slaves), or merely loaned it.
98
Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 670-71.
99
See, e.g., Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 685-86.
100
Interview with Canton Chief of Koure, Niamey, Republic of Niger (May 3, 2018).
101
I participated in such a dispute resolution gathering in 1986 in the Nigerien village of Fandou Berri. At the time, I
was a Peace Corps volunteer living in the village, and to demonstrate my bona fides, I cultivated my own halfhectare of millet, the staple crop. Not long before the harvest, a herder’s son fell asleep (at least that was his story)
and his flock wandered into my field and ate much of my crop. In a country where most people’s livelihoods are
based on subsistence agriculture, this was a gravely serious matter. The village chief and a respected marabout
brought the shepherd’s father and uncles to my hut and, after much discussion, agreed that the family would
apologize and, after the harvest, give me a quantity of their grain. I agreed that the resolution as fair, but declined to
93

69

Kelley

Syracuse J. Int. L. & Comm. Vol. 47.1.

interests of the disputing parties, but also of their ancestors (who now live in the spirit realm),
the black spirits, and the unborn members of the community.102
Chiefs also protected the prerogatives of secondary rights holders in rural land. Although
men inherited access to agricultural land, their rights were not the equivalent of ownership.103
Other members of the community might have durable, enforceable rights to other uses of the
same land.104 For example, women, who are not necessarily from the man’s family unit, might
have the right to gather straw to weave into mats as a source of pocket money.105 They might
also have the right to pick sauce ingredients or plant a small garden.106 Traditional healers
might have the right to harvest medicinal herbs.107 Anyone in the community might have the
right to collect fodder after the harvest to feed farm animals.108 Younger men and slaves
associated with the village might also have secondary, contingent rights in the land at issue.
These rights are not necessarily secure use rights that would permit them to exclude others, but
are culturally enforceable rights to plant and harvest crops to serve their specific needs.109
From the existence of these durable, enforceable secondary rights under customary law, it

accept the grain on grounds I was collecting a stipend from Peace Corps and could afford to feed myself. In the end,
everyone was delighted: harmony was preserved.
102
Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 672.
103
Id. at 682 (arguing agricultural land in Niger is subject to “overlapping use claims”).
104
See SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 309 (arguing secondary rights holders in Kenya might claim access to thatched
grass, fuelwood, wild foods, or sources of water and minerals); Lawrence C. Becker, Land Sales and the
Transformation of Social Relations and Landscape in Peri-Urban Mali, 46 GEOFORUM 113,122 (2013) (arguing
secondary rights holders in Mali might have access to pasture, wood collection, and other economic activities);
Admos Chimhowu and Phil Woodhouse, Customary vs Private Property Rights? Dynamics and Trajectories of
Vernacular Land Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, 6 J. OF AGRARIAN CHANGE 346, 347-48 (2006) (arguing
secondary rights in land act as “‘safety-net’ rights” for the community’s poor); see also CHRISTIAN LUND,
LOCAL POLITICS AND THE DYNAMICS OF PROPERTY IN AFRICA 16 (2008) (referring to the same types of
rights in land as “nested hierarchies of estates”); Aparna Polavarapu, Reconciling Indigenous and Women’s Rights to
Land in Sub- Saharan Africa, GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 93, 114 (2013-2014) (referring to women’s secondary
rights in land as “nested” rights)
105
I base this statement on my own observation of women in the Nigerien village of Fandou Berri; see also Polavarapu,
supra note 104, at 111 (describing women’s secondary land rights under customary law in Botswana).
106
Kelley, supra note 8, at 682.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1007, 1015.
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follows that the holders of primary rights – older male farmers – do not have the right to alienate
their land.110 Indeed, how could an elder male presume the right to sell land to an outsider when
rights in the land also extend to secondary rights holders, spirits from the past, and the yetunborn?
If customary law, which includes land law, functioned properly, the village would enjoy
barka, a term and a concept that does not translate easily into English but includes a spiritual
element which connotes general wellbeing and good luck.111 Barka arises when members of the
village are living in harmony and the various actors in the spirit realm are appeased.112 So long as
barka is maintained, the rains will fall regularly, crops will produce generously, and all will be
well among the living.113
To summarize this archetypal description of customary land law, access rights were based
primarily on proving descent from village founders. All male descendants expected ongoing,
predictable access to agricultural land. Decisions about which land an individual could cultivate
were made by elder males. These elder males included heads of family, lineage heads, and chiefs.
Their decisions about access are influenced by the needs of the spirits and of secondary rights
holders including women, later born men, and slaves. The man who farmed the plot of land could
not be said to own it, because he did not have the right to exclude all others from it. Nor did he
have the right to sell it. He could, however, count on primary access to that land during his
lifetime, and could presume that his sons would inherit undivided shares of the same land. Village
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Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 683; see Hagberg, supra note 60, at 104 (arguing those who attempt to
sell lineage lands in rural Burkina Faso risk sanction from the spirit world).
111
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leaders who allowed this system of interlocking, overlapping, nested rights to deteriorate, risked
the wrath of the spirits and the loss of barka.
B. Complicating the Picture of Customary Law
If the customary Nigerien land law described in the previous section is an ideal, the
contemporary reality can be far more complicated, partly because outside influences have altered
rural life and land. Although many rural Nigerien communities still rely on lineage heads and
traditional chiefs to determine land rights, the second-half of the 20th century ushered in a
profusion of new actors and institutions eager for a role in establishing the rules of the game and
determining winners and losers.
1. The Influence of Colonialism
From the European colonial perspective, Niger was a mostly barren hinterland, so the
French did not arrive on the scene until the dawn of the 20th century.114 France’s approach to
colonialism, sometimes referred to as “direct rule,”115 assumed that their colonial subjects were
uncivilized but that they could aspire – with sufficient tutelage – to evolve into civilized
Frenchmen.116 One aspect of civilized life was private ownership and titling of land, which the
French set about establishing in Niger.117 By the close of the colonial period in 1960, however,
they had made little progress.118
The fact was that although France claimed to practice direct rule, Niger was mostly an
afterthought and so they limited their investment by settling for what the eminent anthropologist,
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Sara Berry, has drolly referred to as “hegemony on the cheap.”119 When it came to land, that
meant introducing the Code Napoléon, including individual ownership and registration of land,
but doing little to enforce it beyond Niamey.120 It also involved declaring that all “unoccupied”
land, which the French meant all land not subject to individual ownership, belonged to the
state.121 Once again, however, the vast majority of the population simply ignored that rule and
went on with their lives as before.122
By the time of Niger’s independence in 1960, the land-related aspects of France’s
civilizing mission had affected rural people in three limited respects. First, it had introduced
the concept, if not the reality, of individual ownership and titling of land.123 Rural people
became vaguely aware that individual ownership of land was a possibility,124 even they viewed
that possibility with disinterest or revulsion.125 Second, the French, who felt the need to
provide housing for colonial officials as well as Nigerien functionaries that worked for the
government, had begun seizing peri-urban farmland and subdividing it into house plots.126 At
the time, that activity affected relatively few rural Nigeriens, but it set the stage for the rampant
rural land loss which is happening today.127 Third, they created the quasi-traditional position of
canton chief, which added powerful new actors to the governance of rural land.128 Otherwise,
the French impact on land law and land use was minimal.129
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2. The Influence of Islam
The rise of Islam in Niger, particularly the recent surge of fundamentalist Islamic

practice, has had more impact on customary land law than the French ever achieved. TransSaharan traders introduced Islam to West Africa in the 8th century.130 In the mid-14th century,
Mansa Mousa, the ruler of the West African Mali Empire, made the Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca
and wowed the world with his vast wealth.131 But Islam spread slowly through West Africa,
mainly along trade routes.132 Niger – a territory always off the beaten track – was late to adopt
the religion in its more orthodox forms.133
Well into the 20th century, most rural Nigeriens professed Islam and adhered strictly to its
Five Pillars134 but blended Islam with pre-Islamic spirit beliefs. Throughout my many visits to
rural Niger over the past thirty years, pious Islamic friends have adjured me not to whistle, never
to say nice things about a baby’s appearance, never to enter the bush before sunrise, and not to
build a hut on the foundation of recently deceased ancestor’s home, all to avoid agitating the
spirit realm.135
Although it is true that until recently Islam has been a “stain not always deep”136 in
Niger, that situation is changing. In recent decades, Niger’s supple blend of Islam and spirit
worship has come under pressure from conservative Islamic influences emanating from the
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Arabian Peninsula.137 Young men in particular are increasingly attracted to what Nigeriens refer
to as “reformist” Islam, partly because it is presented by its promoters as a truer, purer, unsullied
version of their religion and, at least according to some commentators, because it condemns
Nigerien customs surrounding bride price payments, which place insuperable financial burdens
on young men and sometimes prevent them from marrying.138
This gradual but persistent rise of orthodox Islamic beliefs in Niger has led to three
relatively recent changes in customary land law. First, and most simply, it has introduced Islamic
religious leaders as an additional cadre of non-state actors willing to help settle land disputes.139
By the 1980s, village patriarchs’ and village chiefs’ efforts to mediate land questions in rural
communities routinely involved local Islamic marabouts as part of the process.140 In some
intractable land disputes, it is now common for one or both parties to seek a ruling by a
regionally prominent Islamic sheik141 or to a national Islamic association.142
Second, land-related nostrums in the Koran have led rural residents to a gradual
acknowledgement, if not yet acceptance, of individual ownership and inheritance of land.143 The
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Koran calls for male descendants to share equally in land and female descendants to receive halfshares.144 Thus far, no one I have encountered in rural Niger has suggested abandoning the
customary law that permits only men to inherit land; however, Islamic law, perhaps in
combination with the French colonial legacy, has nudged rural people closer to the view that
land is something to be owned and inherited individually without the mediating influence of
traditional leaders.145
Finally, the spirits, including the original gangi bi land spirits and the spirits of ancestors,
today play a diminishing role in determining land use and outcomes. It is not that rural people
believe there are no spirits; rather they believe that Islam is ascendant and that the spirits
therefore have less power than they once did.146
3. The Influence of Economic Liberalization
Notions about individual ownership of land, registration of land rights, and the
possibility of land sales, were pushed upon rural Nigeriens with much more force starting the
late 1980s and 1990s with the rise of global liberalization.147
In Niger’s case, the liberal agenda included, among other features, the passage of a
comprehensive land reform law known as the Rural Code and overall government
decentralization, both of which have affected land rights and laid the groundwork for the
transformation of peri-urban land from communal custom to individual ownership.148
The story of liberalization in Africa is long, complicated, and in some respects tragic,149
but a summary version must suffice here. When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet
144
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Union collapsed, the United States became, at least temporarily, the world’s only superpower.150
If poor countries in the Global South wanted help paying their bills, they could no longer count
on playing the U.S. and the Soviet Union off of one another.151 They would have to agree to
economic and political reforms dictated by the U.S., its allies, and the international financial
institutions they controlled.152 Those policies collectively became known as the Washington
Consensus.153
The Consensus was geared toward shrinking and democratizing the state and allowing
the free hand of the market to work its magic.154 Governments across Africa, if they wished to
benefit from the Global North’s economic largess, were compelled to slash civil service rolls,
eliminate regulations, privatize state-owned industries, roll back subsidies, and commit to free
and fair elections and democratic governance.155 Another key tenet of the Washington
Consensus was the need to privatize, title and register land.156 Based on the writings of the
Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, the assumption was that poor countries such as Niger
remain poor because its citizens lack secure rights in their own land.157 The Nigerien farmer
with no formal deed to the land he tills cannot pledge it as collateral to buy fertilizer or a tractor
and thereby intensify his investment.158 As a result, he sits on an under-exploited pile of “dead
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capital” and remains mired in poverty.159 The key to unlocking prosperity in poor countries,
therefore, was the reform and formalization of land rights,160 which would allow property
owners to “revive their ‘dead’ capital and generate surplus value from their assets.”161
To summarize in one sentence the results of the Consensus economic policies –
including land titling – they inflicted significant pain and suffering on poor people in the Global
South while producing few of the advertised economic benefits.162 Nevertheless,
Niger was an early and enthusiastic adopter Consensus policies, including land titling.163
In 1993, in keeping with the Consensus and just as the country was embarking on its first
experiment with democratically elected government, it adopted a comprehensive new set of land
laws, referred to as the Rural Code,164 aimed at bringing order and consistency to what aid experts
and central government officials viewed as the country’s confusing jumble of land customs and
practices.165 It was an enormously ambitious scheme that can only be summarized here. It
envisaged the creation of a series of land commissions at various levels of government and
procedures by which those who control land could obtain and register individual title to it.166 In
theory, the Rural Code and its administrative processes took a culturally sensitive approach to land
reform in that it claimed that communal rights and secondary rights – the sort of customary land
rights described in Part III.A., above – were eligible for registration and protection.167 However, as
the Rural Code began to roll out, it became abundantly clear that government agents were intent on
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registering land in the names of individuals, not groups, as part of an overall effort to comply with
Consensus dictates and “modernize” Niger’s land laws.168
Several excellent articles and books have been written about Niger’s attempts at land law
reform.169 The short version is that in more than two decades, the reforms have had limited
effect.170 Peasant farmers find the process of land registration cumbersome and expensive, and
they still generally prefer to deal directly with traditional chiefs.171 The chiefs, who receive
prestige and money by recognizing land claims and conciliating land disputes, encourage the view
that nothing has changed, that other local political actors such as mayors and councilors are
impotent, and that the Rural Code’s land commissions are a waste of time.172 Even where farmers
are motivated to formally register their lands – and some are, particularly where there are disputes
over access or the threat of state expropriation – the government often lacks resources and
personnel to maintain the necessary registers.173
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4. The Influence of Government Decentralization
As Niger’s government began implementing the Rural Code the early 1990s, it

simultaneously dove into government decentralization, which is another aspect of the standard
consensus liberalization package.174 Lawmakers hoped these two reforms would mesh
seamlessly and that the new procedures for registering rural land would be carried out by
grassroots officials, including locally elected councilors and mayors whose positions were
created by the new decentralization legislation.175 That was not how things turned out.176
The theory behind decentralization was that if responsibility for revenue collection and
service delivery were pushed down from the central government to locally elected officials,
there would be greater accountability and efficiency.177 Decisions on whether to invest in
road maintenance or the construction of markets would be made at the local level and local
people would hold their officials – local councilors and mayors whose offices had been
created by the decentralization legislation – accountable for results.178 If local leaders spent
public money unwisely or irresponsibly, or more to the point, if tax revenues disappeared as a
result of corruption, local voters would know it and would elect new local representatives.179
Likewise, decisions about land ownership and registration, whether in rural or urban areas,
would be most accurately and efficiently carried out by local governments and local
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officials.180 After all, they would be closest to the facts on the ground and they would be
accountable to local land users.181
More than twenty years in, most observers judge decentralization to be a failure both in
rural areas and in Niamey.182 One problem was that, the scheme gave local governments major
responsibility for service delivery – including responsibility for implementing the Rural Code’s
new land registration procedures – but virtually no resources with which to achieve those
tasks.183 Also, central government actors who had long enjoyed unquestioned authority were
reluctant to surrender their prerogatives, including the rent seeking opportunities that go along
with controlling finances, so they simply delayed and obfuscated when it came to devolving
power to lower levels of government.184
In the end, all that decentralization accomplished was to add a low-level,
comparatively powerless set of government actors to an already crowded and chaotic
institutional matrix.185 Before decentralization, a jumble of customary chiefs, Islamic
religious leaders, and representatives of the central government vied with one another for
legitimacy and power in both rural and urban areas.186 Decentralization laws added local
councilors and mayors to the mix, a group that brought no historical legitimacy and no
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additional resources with which to entice adherents.187 They ended up being easily outcompeted by central government authorities, who never removed their fingers from the purse
strings, and by traditional chiefs, who either isolated them by convincing rural people to
ignore them, or coopted them by having their own relatives run for local office.188
The failure of decentralization has contributed to an atmosphere of “general
dysfunction”189 when it comes to land registration in rural areas.190 Because there are no
resources to create and maintain cadastral systems at the lower levels of government, and
because there is constant competition from other actors, precious few parcels of rural land
are actually being registered in rural areas.191
In spite of these institutional failures, the Rural Code (including its plans for titling
and registration of land) and government decentralization have in combination affected
land and land use in peri-urban areas in two respects. First, they have helped spread the
word about the concept of individual ownership and registration of land. Although land
ownership is not an entirely new concept, having been introduced to rural communities by
the French and by the rise of “reformist” Islam, until recently it has been more of a rumor
than a reality.192
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IV.

The Death of Customary Law in Peri-Urban Niamey

Peri-urban development around African cities tends to follow major paved roads that lead
to the countryside, and eventually link to other major cities and towns.193 Since 1986, for more
than 30 years, I have regularly traveled on Niamey’s Filingue Road, which heads east-northeast
out of the capital toward the town of Filingue.194 Therefore, I have had a consistent reference
point by which to track Niamey’s growth. As late as the mid-2000s, the Filingue Road had one
gas station across from the Wadata Market, in what was the edge of the city. Drivers, including
me, often filled up there before leaving town and venturing into the bush. There was sporadic
development along the road beyond the gas station, but few permanent structures. As one exited
the city, the landscape quickly turned to millet fields and tree nurseries. The first village, Saga
Gourou, approximately 10 kilometers from the Wadata gas station, looked and felt as if it
belonged to a different world, a rural world.
When I drove out of Niamey along the Filingue Road in 2018, I counted eleven gas
stations beyond my old fill-up spot.195 The road was lined with commercial buildings,
compounds, and, behind that commercial strip, residential neighborhoods as far as the eye could
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see. The rampant development has engulfed the village of Saga Gourou. Clearly, something
dramatic is happening to land around Niamey.196
A. History of Land in Niamey and Environs
The city of Niamey was, to a large extent, a colonial creation.197 Before the French
arrived at the turn of the 20th century, there were several villages along the banks of the Niger
River, in the area of present-day Niamey, but no significant cities or towns.198 During the
early years of their colonial project in Niger, the French vacillated between Zinder and
Niamey as their center of activity.199 But Niamey had attractive views of the Niger River and
an airy plateau where the colonial overlords could build their offices and residences. In 1926,
the French established a permanent capital there.200
The airy plateau favored by the French was located between two villages that became
important actors in the story of Niamey’s peri-urban land transformation. To the west, and
somewhat upriver, was the village of Goudel.201 To the east, and somewhat downriver, was
the village of Gamkallay.202 Historically, their fields were divided by a watercourse and gully
that now bisects Niamey.203 Today, both former villages are considered neighborhoods of the
capital city.204
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NB: Much of this description, including the presence of the eleven gas stations beyond Wadata, can be verified
on Google Maps. The first village, Saga Gorou, is not identified by name but you can see the settlement on the
satellite version.
197
Meyer, supra note 20, at 93.
198
See id. (arguing in pre-colonial days, present-day Niamey was away from major trade routes and a “zone of
refuge” for diverse peoples).
199
NJOH, supra note 27, at 546. Meyer, supra note 20, at 99 (arguing the city of Zinder, located in eastern Niger,
was a city of longstanding political and economic importance.
200
MEYER, supra note 20, at 99.
201
Id. at 94.
202

Id.
See id.at 96 (arguing Gamkalle and Goudel originally controlled the land that later became Niamey and that
the dividing line between them was the ravine of Gunti Yena, a stream that enters the Niger River).
204
Based on personal knowledge, Gamkalle and Goudel are not the only villages incorporated into Niamey over
the decades. For example, Gaway, a pre-colonial fishing settlement on the banks of the Niger River, was displaced
during the 1970s to make room for the present-day Hotel Gawaye. The government moved Gaway’s residents
203
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The French set about transforming land law in their new colony, but, as discussed in Part
III, they made little progress in rural areas.205 The vast majority of Niger’s people simply
ignored the putative changes in land law and went on with their lives as before.206
But this was less the case in and around Niamey. By the 1950s, the colonial regime was
beginning to carve up rural land on the city’s outskirts – largely in what had been the
agricultural fields of Goudel and Gamkale – to produce subdivided residential parcels, mostly
for civil servants and veterans who had regular salaries.207 Because the French did not
recognize customary claims, they simply requisitioned what they considered empty land and
dedicated it to their preferred uses.208
The colonists’ subdivision of land around Niamey for residential purposes was slow and
steady until the late 1950s,209 when it began to accelerate as a result of economic growth, high
birth rates, and two great droughts in 1972-73 and 1983-84.210 Rural people were being
pushed by crisis but also pulled by opportunity as pre- and post-Independence governments
focused their limited resources on developing schools, health care facilities, and other
infrastructure in cities.211 The rapid growth in urban population outstripped the government’s

across the Niger River to a newly settled area called Haro Banda and compensated them by granting them multiple
subdivided house plots. Another village, Saga, had much of its territory expropriated by Niger’s government to
build Diori Hamani Airport on what was then the outskirts of the capital. Today, Niamey has grown around and
beyond the airport and Saga is considered a suburban neighborhood.
205
See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
206
Id.
207
MEYER, supra note 20, at 105; see Korling, supra note 20, at 73 (arguing that since the colonial period urban
planning in Niamey has focused on subdivision of land, but that the planning has always fallen behind actual
expansion).
208
Meyer, supra note 20, at 3.
209
Motcho, supra note 48, at 2 (describing Niamey’s rapid population growth during the late colonial and early
independence periods and rising demand for parcels of land).
210
Meyer, supra note 20, at 109.
211
Ocheje, supra note 116, at 187.
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ability to convert land from farms to house plots,212 and the result was the appearance of
informal, mostly unplanned neighborhoods around Niamey’s periphery.213
When the French colonialists departed in 1960 and the post-independence
government took control, little changed, at least in the realm of law.214 The newly
independent country declared that the French Civil Code would continue to be the law of the
land,215 and the vast majority of Niger’s citizens continued to ignore that formal law, just as
they had under the French.216 In Niamey, however, the post-independence government held
more sway than in rural areas and was able, at least to a certain extent, to continue the
colonial land practices and policies.217 Particularly during the reign of Sayni Kountche, a
military dictator who ruled from 1974-1987, the Nigerien state carried on with expropriating
significant tracts of land on the periphery of the city, all by military decree, and dedicating it
to providing housing for the city’s growing population.218 As was true during colonialism,
much of the land was taken from farmers from the villages of Gamkale and Goudel.
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Korling, supra note 20, at 73.
Meyer, supra note 20, at 107 (arguing some of the informal neighborhoods were later formalized while others
were not).
214
Njoh, supra note 27, at 547, 549; Meyer, supra note 20, at 107.
215
Njoh, supra note 27, at 550
216
Njoh, supra note 27 (Niger’s post-independence governments periodically issued decrees and passed laws
attempting to reform land practice. For example, in the 1970s, the military regime of President Sayni Kountche
decreed a new policy of mise en valeur: the notion that henceforth all rural land would “belong” to those who were
farming it); Kelley, supra note 8, Squeezing Parakeets Into Pigeon Holes: The Effect of Globalization and State
Legal Reform in Niger on Indigenous Zarma Law, at 685. Many said that in fact this policy was Kountche’s attempt
to remove or at least weaken chiefs’ power of land tenure matters; Kelley, supra note 8, Squeezing Parakeets Into
Pigeon Holes: The Effect of Globalization and State Legal Reform in Niger on Indigenous Zarma Law, at 685. In
the end, it really did not matter, since resilient rural Nigeriens largely ignored that policy too..
217
Meyer, supra note 20, at 107.
218
See supra note 208 (arguing Niger’s post-independence governments seized his family’s lands without
compensation and dedicated them to Niamey’s Green Belt); Kelley, supra note 8, at 138 (arguing the Kountche
regime also continued the expansion of the colonialist’s Green Belt).
213

86

Death of Custom:
Winners and Losers in the Legal Transformation of Peri-Urban Land in Niger
B. Decentralization Struggles Lead to Chaos in Urban and
Peri-Urban Land Management
Fundamental changes in land law, changes that have profoundly affected the lives and
livelihoods of people living in peri-urban zones, did not accelerate until the 1990s, the era of
economic liberalization, democratization, and government decentralization described in Part
III, above. Niger, whether by choice or compulsion, fully implemented Washington
Consensus reforms including land law reform and government decentralization. While those
policies had comparatively little impact in isolated rural areas,219 they began to alter peoples’
lives in peri- urban zones around the capital.
The land transformation in and around Niamey began in earnest as an indirect result of
government decentralization. In 2002, Niamey’s central government, the Urban Community of
Niamey (“CUN”) was divided into five separate local governments, known as communes, each
with significant responsibility for providing municipal services.220 Importantly, each of the
urban communes had the authority to subdivide and sell land on its periphery.221 The
communes quickly realized that the central government was going to do little to help pay for
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Njoh, supra note 27 (Niger’s post-independence governments periodically issued decrees and passed laws
attempting to reform land practice. For example, in the 1970s, the military regime of President Sayni Kountche
decreed a new policy of mise en valeur: the notion that henceforth all rural land would “belong” to those who were
farming it); Kelley, supra note 8, Squeezing Parakeets Into Pigeon Holes: The Effect of Globalization and State
Legal Reform in Niger on Indigenous Zarma Law, at 685. Many said that in fact this policy was Kountche’s attempt
to remove or at least weaken chiefs’ power of land tenure matters; Kelley, supra note 8, Squeezing Parakeets Into
Pigeon Holes: The Effect of Globalization and State Legal Reform in Niger on Indigenous Zarma Law, at 685. In
the end, it really did not matter, since resilient rural Nigeriens largely ignored that policy too.; Meyer, supra note 20,
at 107.
220
Meyer, supra note 20, at 227.
221
Meyer, supra note 20, at 111.
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governmental services,222 and that converting peri-urban land from farms to house plots was a
source of desperately needed revenue.223
The communes quickly realized that the central government was going to do little to
help pay for governmental services,224 and that converting peri-urban land from farms to house
plots was a source of desperately-needed revenue.225 Not incidentally, subdividing and selling
land also created rent-seeking opportunities for commune officials, of which they took full
advantage.226 With these dynamics at play, the urban communes enthusiastically dove into the
business of converting farmland around the city into subdivided house plots.227
During this period, however, there was growing tension between Niamey’s newly
empowered commune governments and the CUN.

From the CUN’s perspective, the

communes squabbled with one another, refused to collaborate, and prevented the CUN from
playing its rightful role as coordinator.228 From the communes’ perspective, the CUN simply
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Kelley, supra note 8, at 682; LOERENZO COTULA, ET. AL., LAND TENURE AND ADMINISTRATION IN
AFRICA: LESSONS OFEXPERIENCE AND EMERGING ISSUES 13 (2004) (arguing Niger’s Rural Code
purports to respect customary rights but places the new land system firmly under the control of non-customary
actors); Ubink, Tenure Security, supra note 57, at 222 (arguing titling schemes in the African context often ignore
secondary rights holders); Chimhowu & Woodhouse, supra note 104, at 347 (arguing land registration schemes in
Africa claim to register group rights but usually aim for individualized ownership “formalized in a written title to
physically-demarcated land”); Njoh, supra note 27, at 540 (arguing the decentralization that was supposed to
accompany the Rural Code “never really materialized”); Meyer, supra note 20, at 224, 251 (arguing the institutions
of the state lack legitimacy in land matters, that people still turn to chiefs instead of local officials); Bron-Saidatou,
supra note 26, at 20 (arguing commune level governments in peri-urban areas lack the power the money to control
land matters)
223
See Interview with Former Mayor of Commune 5 of Niamey, Niamey, Republic of Niger (May 2, 2018) (arguing
the communes produced revenues from developing peri-urban land and spent it on service provision); Meyer, supra
note 20, at 227; Korling, supra note 20, at 109 (arguing zoning power appeared to the commune governments as a
“golden opportunity” to produce revenue).
224
See Korling, supra note 20, at 108 (arguing commune governments were given much responsibility for service
delivery but few means to raise funds).
225
Meyer, supra note 20, at 227 (arguing that subdividing land provided revenues to commune-level governments).
226
See Korling, supra note 20, at 81 (arguing that the process of subdividing land is complicated and corrupt);
Issaka, supra note 1 (arguing that in the 1990s the communes were practically the only ones subdividing land around
Niamey and that corruption had been at the heart of the system).
227
Meyer, supra note 20, at 233.
228
Id. at 227
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did not want to relinquish its centralized power.229 By 2011 the struggle between Niamey’s
communes and the CUN was over and, for political reasons beyond the scope of this article,230
the CUN had reasserted control of city government, including the development of peri-urban
land.231 The CUN’s inability to handle the volume of land transactions and the entry of private
developers to the market conjunctively catalyzed chaos in peri-urban land development.232
C. Enter the Private Developers
Before the CUN mayor’s office could bring order to peri-urban land development, it
was overtaken by the arrival of private land developers in the market.233 Legal changes in the
late 1990s authorized private development,234 but its influence was not felt until the mid2000s when a governmental decree definitively removed the state’s monopoly and made it
possible for anyone possessing peri-urban land to subdivide and sell it.235 The idea was to
unburden the government from constantly having to search for resources to carry out
necessary improvements for the process of converting agricultural land to house plots: the
provision of roads, public buildings, water, electricity, and other infrastructure.236 The effect,
however, was to permit private actors, particularly those with working capital, to suddenly and
entirely take over land development on the edge of the city.237 There has been a boom in the
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Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey Commune 5 (May 2, 2018), supra note 180.
In brief, Niger experienced a coup d’état in 2010 and the military government preferred to govern the city by
naming its own top officials. See Meyer supra note 20, at 228.
231
Id. at 113, 22
232
Id. at 228 (arguing the CUN mayor’s office attempted to centralize all land-related record-keeping, resulting in
boxes of disorganized records piled high in the corridors, complete lack of file verification, and some parcels being
sold multiple times).
233
Id. at 229.
234
Issaka, supra note 1 (arguing many private developers entered the Niamey land market after legal reforms in
1997); Meyer, supra note 20, at 118.
235
Meyer, supra note 20, at 227, 229 (arguing private developers were not fully able to participate in development
of peri-urban land until a government decree in 2000).
236
Id. at 229.
237
Id. at 235, 238.
230
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development of peri-urban land since 2010,238 and every new subdivision around Niamey has
been undertaken by private developers.239
Most of the leading private actors have been individuals who, through personal
contacts and prior experience, know how to navigate the tortuous bureaucratic process
involved in converting farmland into suburbs.240 Some acquired their knowledge by
working on the inside of the state bureaucracy and their core expertise is keeping up on the
constant modifications to the arcane procedural requirements.241 Others have become
powerful private actors because of family ties to chiefs in the peri-urban zones.242 They use
their connections to identify potential sellers of land and to negotiate with lineage heads.243
The former group of intermediaries are familiar with the corridors of power and the constant
flux in the rules, while the latter keep tabs on who owns which lands and who might be
convinced to sell.244 The most effective of the middlemen combine both competencies.245
They propose their service directly to customary owners, offering the enticing possibility of
selling their land without having to engage directly with the distasteful, even dreaded,
government bureaucracy; and often offering better terms than those offered by communelevel mayors’ offices (before municipal government was re- centralized) or the CUN (before
it was squeezed out of the game).246
The entrance of private developers into peri-urban land markets have led to the
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Id. at 242.
Issaka, supra note 1 (arguing private developers have become more powerful actors than government); Meyer,
supra note 20, at 229.
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See Meyer, supra note 20, at 236.
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emergence of symbiotic, mafia-like networks between the private actors and government
officials.247 The developers, many of whom have grown vastly wealthy, grease the necessary
palms in the state bureaucracy to ensure their development plans are approved,248 whether or
not those plans comply with state requirements, or the best practices for infrastructure, public
space, and the like.249 In recent years, the developers’ corrupt influence is rumored to go even
deeper and higher.250 Some have become so wealthy that they are able to pour vast amounts
of money into electoral campaigns to ensure the election of officials who are sympathetic to
their projects.251 Once this is accomplished and their friends are in office, the tortuous
governmental regulatory and permitting processes become crystal clear and streamlined for
the politicians’ patron but remains tortuous and opaque for the patron’s competitors.252 It is
common knowledge in Niamey that these relationships reach the highest levels of
government, which means no bureaucrat, at any level of the state apparatus, can safely
impede the private developers’ plans – whether for corrupt or legitimate public safety
reasons.253
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See id. at 241.
See Korling, supra note 20, at 80, 91 (arguing the sale of peri-urban house plots is the source of corrupt
practices, that Niamey city hall is a “locus of negotiations and access,” and that government officials are typically
bribed by offering them plots in the subdivisions they authorize); Interview with Former Niamey Mayor of
Commune 5 (insert interview source, and location) (May 2, 2019), supra note 180 (arguing “[t]he only way to
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249
See Korling, supra note 20, at 90; Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey Commune 5 (insert interview
source, and location) (May 2, 2019), supra note 180.
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See Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey Commune 5 (insert interview source, and location) (May 2, 2018),
supra note 180 (arguing the land system around Niamey is “full of corruption,” that faulty development plans are
routinely approved by corrupt CUN officials, and that the office of Niger’s president overrules decisions by lower
level government offices that might block development plans).
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Meyer, supra note 20, at 241.
252
Id.
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See id. at 244-245, 259; see generally Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey Commune 5 (insert interview
source, and location) (May 2, 2019), supra note 180 (arguing his private business was suffering because those in
political power were steering business away from him).
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As in rural areas,254 in peri-urban zones there is an ongoing struggle over who has
formal authority to authorize the transition from farmland to suburban house plots.255 Chiefs
in peri- urban zones vie with formal CUN officials, who in turn vie with various central
government ministers and their underlings whose portfolios touch on land development.256
But since the entrance of wealthy, politically connected private developers onto the scene, the
contest for formal authority matters less257 because the private actors simply push aside the
competing organs of the state and carry out their development plans in whatever way will
maximize their profits.258 The state has become one actor among many, and in most instances
it not the most powerful one.259 The result, discussed in more detail in Part V., below, is that
it has become “impossible to manage the peri-urban land for the good of all, especially for the
lowest level of society.”260
D. The Current Situation
Today, land in the vicinity of Niamey is coveted and the market is frenzied.261 Although
the large private developers described above are dominant players and reap the greatest rewards,
it seems that everyone with capital to invest is jostling to get into the game.262 Business people
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Meyer, supra note 20, at 225.
Meyer supra note 20, at 225.
256
Id. at 211, 225, 256 (arguing the Ministries of Environment, Urbanism, Cadaster, and Education all have
claims to authorize peri-urban land transactions, but that Urbanism is the most powerful so private developer
with clout skip the other ministries and go straight to Urbanism).
257
See Issaka, supra note 1 (arguing the developers and their highly placed patrons in central government succeeded
in pushing the lower level commune governments out of the way even though they were supposed to have authority
over subdividing land); Meyer, supra note 20, at 225.
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Meyer, supra note 20, at 224; Interview with A Highly Placed Official in Niger’s Ministry of Environment and
of Durable Development, Niamey, Republic of Niger (May 11, 2018) (arguing the rise of private developers means
no one is taking account of the public interest and it is now all about generating profit).
259
Meyer, supra note 20, at 225.
260
Id.
261
See Issaka, supra note 1 (employing the French term “combat foncier” meaning “land combat” to describe
the real estate market in peri-urban areas around Niamey).
262
See Interview with Retired Office Worker, Niamey, Republic of Niger (insert interview source, and location)
(April 28, 2018) (describing his purchases of various empty house lots in towns near Niamey); see also Interview
255
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who have no background in land development and whose main activities focus on general
commerce or transportation, are buying up empty lots in the fast-spreading peri-urban
neighborhoods with an eye toward flipping them or developing them.263 Those with sufficient
means purchase the lots in large quantities,264 often in cahoots with government officials with
whom they split the profits when prices rise.265 While others purchase large tracts of agricultural
land located far from the city;266 and some plan to subdivide the land quickly and sell to smallerscale speculators.267 Others intend to sit on the distant land until the fast-expanding city
approaches their holdings and pushes the value upward.268
Poor urban Nigeriens are nowhere to be seen in this scramble for peri-urban land. The
government, with the support and advice of aid agencies, has begun in recent years entering into
public-private partnerships to establish new logement social (“social” or “affordable” housing) in

with Two Real Estate Developers, Niamey, Republic of Niger (insert interview source, and location) (April 30,
2018) (discussing where one developer was a former lawyer and the other was until recently a “documentary
filmmaker” and still had that profession on his business card).
263
See Interview with El Hadji Merchant, Niamey, Republic of Niger (insert interview source, and location) (May
4, 2018) (describing a merchant with no development experience revealing his plans for developing recently
purchased peri-urban land); Interview with a Businessman, Niamey, Republic of Niger (insert interview source, and
location) (May 4, 2018) (describing an uneducated businessman with no prior experience in land development
revealing his participation in a large peri-urban social housing development); Interview with Two Real Estate
Developers, supra note 262 (describing two principals of a social housing project, one a former lawyer, the other a
documentary film maker).
264
See e.g., Interview with El Hadji Merchant, supra note 263.
265
Meyer, supra note 20, at 225.
266
See Interview with Two Real Estate Developers, supra note 262 (describing a housing development located
approximately 30 kilometers from Niamey); Interview with El Hadji Merchant, supra note 263 (describing his
purchase and conversion of land approximately 20 kilometers outside of Niamey).
267
See Issaka, supra note 1 (arguing many speculators have entered Niamey’s land markets); Cotula et. al., supra
note 168, at 27 (arguing many urban elites are speculating in peri-urban land markets).
268
See Interview with El Hadji Merchant, supra note 263 (arguing he will leave much of his recent peri-urban
land purchase “in reserve” to allow prices to rise).
Major business actors are not the only ones fueling the red-hot peri-urban land markets. Peri-urban land
is one of Niger’s few investment opportunities, so many salaried employees (primarily civil servants) are
purchasing multiple undeveloped plots in recently subdivided neighborhoods outside of town, often while living
in small rented lodgings in the city. Meyer, supra note 20, at 233. In fact, it is rare that the first purchaser of a
newly subdivided plot actually constructs a house and moves in. Id. Most initial buyers are investors and often it
is the second or third purchaser who constructs a residence. Id. at 234 ((offering an example of one house plot in a
peri-urban neighborhood that originally was purchased for 60,000 CFA (approximately $ at current exchange
rates), that changed hands twice, and eventually sold for 2 million CFA to the person who constructed a house.)
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peri-urban zones.269 However, in spite of the “social” moniker, little, if any, of the resulting
housing is within the means of poor people.270
From the perspective of an academic studying land in Niger, this is a fascinating
transitional moment in which the rules governing peri-urban land and land use are changing
rapidly. But from the perspective of farmers living in peri-urban zones this transition signals
and end to a way of life. Whether their land is purchased by a developer, or condemned by the
state, once official title has been printed and properly registered, the purchaser’s rights are
secure and the rural people, along with their rural beliefs, rural ways of life, and rural
livelihoods, are out of the game. The transition to suburbs is irreversible271 and the land
becomes a commodity like oranges on special in Niamey’s Petit Marche.272

269
Alexandra Biehler, Armelle Choplin, Marie Morelle, Le Logement Sociale en Afriquie: Un Modele a
(Re)inventer?, (May 18, 2015), available at https://www.metropolitiques.eu/Le-logement-social-en-Afriqueun.html (Last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (at p .1 arguing NGOs and international agencies have supported social
housing). Meyer, supra note 20, at 240 (mentioning social housing in Niger and arguing it does not benefit the
poor).
Based on personal observation, these social housing neighborhoods are popping up like mushrooms in
rural areas around Niamey. Because they are being developed well outside the boundaries of the city, they can be
a startling, incongruous sight as one drives through the bush. The completed neighborhood can include hundreds
of residential units, typically a mix of one, two, and three-bedroom cement, metal-roofed houses, each with a
small, walled concession surrounding it, all packed closely together. See Interview with Two Real Estate
Developers, supra note 262 (describing a social housing site under construction approximately 30 kilometers
from Niamey). They often are completely surrounded by agricultural fields where farmers go about their
traditional routines of planting and cultivating subsistence crops and husbanding their animals. See id. (describing
a new social housing site next to what appeared to be a millet field).
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Interview with Two Real Estate Developers (insert interview source, and location) (April 30, 2018), supra note
262 (in a typical social housing project, the government and private financial institutions combine forces to make
mortgages available to prospective purchasers. The banks agree to loan money at comparatively moderate rates of
interest and the government agrees to deduct the monthly payments directly from the borrowers’ paychecks. This
means, of course, that only Nigeriens with regular paychecks, or who live overseas – together a wafer-thin slice of
Niger’s population – can take advantage of the programs); see KORLING, supra note 20, at 79 (arguing Niger claims
that provision of housing for the poor is a key to poverty reduction but in fact has provided exceedingly little that is
accessible to the poor).
271
See Interview with Two Real Estate Developers (insert interview source, and location)
(April 28, 2018), supra note 262 (arguing that once they have formal title in hand, they have no fear that farmers
will be able to challenge their ownership of land).
272
Meyer, supra note 20, at 235; see Interview with Former Gamkalle Resident and His Friend (May 5, 2018), supra
note 208 (arguing that “land has become money”); Interview with Insurance Executive, Niamey, Republic of Niger,
(May 5, 2018) (arguing “land was religious; now it is money”).
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D. Summary
Niamey was created during the colonial era on land expropriated from the nearby
villages of Gamkale and Goudel. As the city’s population steadily grew, the colonial
government expropriated and subdivided land on its periphery–land that the French considered
vacant–to provide residences for its functionaries. Once the land was subdivided, it was subject
to the Code Napoléon. However, the scale of this conversion was modest; most rural people
were unaffected, and their lives continued as before.
Niger’s post-colonial governments carried on in a manner similar to the French. As
Niamey’s population growth accelerated, the state expropriated and converted larger swaths of
surrounding land, primarily still from the domains of Goudel and Gamkale. At times,
population growth outstripped the government’s ability to subdivide land, and so informal
settlements began to appear on what had been agricultural land.
Starting in the 1990s, democratization, economic liberalization, and decentralization,
combined with accelerating population growth in Niamey, led to a dramatic increase in the
city’s expansion and an accompanying flood of land conversions from fields to suburbs.
Various sources of authority–the CUN, central government ministries, local government
officials, and chiefs–vied with one another for authority over peri-urban land transactions and
attendant spoils. However, beginning in 2010, most of the governmental actors were shoved
to the side by the entrance of private land developers, who formed mafia-like networks in
cahoots with high government officials. Suddenly, all limits to peri-urban land development
vanished and a scramble for profits ensued. Developers and speculators began purchasing,
subdividing, titling and registering formerly agricultural lands at a blistering pace, sometimes
scores of kilometers outside the city. The private developers had no reason to care about poor
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people which included the peasant farmers selling their ancestral lands. The government of
Niger claims they provide “social housing” to meet the needs of the poor, but in fact only
comparatively well-off Nigeriens are eligible to participate.
The next section explores who wins and who loses as a result of Niger’s periurban transformation.
V.

Winners and Losers When Peri-Urban Land is Transformed from
Customary to Formal
The physical and legal transformation of peri-urban land around Niamey produces

winners and losers.273 In general, the winners are those with power and wealth who take
advantage of the transition to increase their bounty.274 The losers are peasant farmers whose
livelihoods disappear and who forfeit the historical and spiritual foundations that have until
now have provided order and meaning to their lives.275
A. Winners
Among scholars, it is a generally accepted nostrum that legal transformations in poor
countries benefit elites.276 The reason is obvious: elites are better positioned to shape the
details of the new legal rules to serve their own interests.277 Once the new rules are in place,
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rural people are usually the losers); see SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 144 (arguing early practitioners of land
privatization and titling in Kenya, which was a precursor to such efforts across sub-Saharan Africa, assumed
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traditional authorities often control land entitlements); Falk, supra note 171, at 1 (arguing land tenure reform always
ends up redistributing land from the poor to the rich); Polavarapu, supra note 104, at 98 (arguing that in Botswana
land tenure security is enjoyed only by the “rich and legally adroit”); COTULA, ET. AL., supra note 168, at 3
(arguing “elites claim land that isn’t theirs when they know registration is coming”).
275
See supra notes _ and accompanying text.
276
See Korling, supra note 20, at 78 (arguing in Niger urban policy and investment always serves elites); SHIPTON,
supra note 8 (arguing when land is converted from customary control to freehold title, “the best-informed and bestconnected people” benefit); Ubink, Tenure Security, supra note 57, at 222.
277
See Njoh, supra note 27, at 542 (arguing changes in zoning laws usually protect the rights and privileges of the
wealthy).
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they have the necessary knowledge, capital, and connections to consolidate their advantages
before less informed societal actors become aware of the shift.278 The transformation of land
law in peri- urban Niger is a case in point.279
1. Private Real Estate Developers and Investors and the
Government Officials with Whom They Collaborate
Private developers have emerged as the biggest winners in the conversion of peri-urban
land. At the top of the developer pyramid are the leaders of the mafia-like networks that have
infiltrated and dominated all levels of the state apparatus, and who have amassed fortunes by
converting large swaths of agricultural land into house plots.280 But those land kingpins are
not the only private real estate actors who have thrived as a result of the transition.
Lower tiers of private developers have gotten into the game. Companies are forming
in Niamey to build the social housing developments around the city’s periphery.281 Some
complain that their profit margins are thin. However, the recent profusion of these project
indicate that they are generating profits.282
A third tier of wealthy elites benefit from the conversion of peri-urban land. These are
the wealthy El Hadji merchants from the city who until now have had few options for
diversifying their investments within Niger.283 They are moving into land speculation, buying
large tracts of undeveloped agricultural property, sometimes twenty or more kilometers from the

278

See JIMU, supra note 2, at 7 (arguing that in African contexts urban actors seeking land can take advantage of
the poverty and ignorance of rural sellers).
279
See Njoh, supra note 27, at 542; see infra Part V.B.
280
See Issaka, supra note 1 (arguing certain private developers of peri-urban land have become more powerful than
governmental actors).
281
See supra note _.
282
See Issaka, supra note 1 (arguing corporations have entered the land development market and have made
substantial profits).
283
Id.; Interview with El Hadji Merchant (insert interview source, and location) (May 4, 2018), supra note 263.
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city.284 Different merchants employ different strategies. Once they have established titled
ownership of the land, many subdivide it into plots even if they intend to sit on it until Niamey
grows closer and the value of the plots increases.285 Some intend to sell the plots piecemeal to
other smaller investors, or even to potential residents.286 Still others have grander plans to move
into the business of real estate development by constructing the social housing projects described
above.287 Whatever the details of their development strategies, wealthy businessmen based in the
capital are mobilizing to take advantage of the shift to private ownership of land.
These private developers become so successful partly by collaborating with government
officials who can claim formal authority over land transactions. There is still lively competition
among the governmental actors to determine whose authority will prevail, but as the competition
plays out it is clear that many are prospering. They formed corrupt symbiotic relationships that
strengthened their claims to authority over government institutions and, simultaneously,
produced significant private wealth.288
Amidst this struggle for legitimacy and advantage among multifarious organs of the
state apparatus, traditional chiefs – historically a resilient and adaptable group289-- have found
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See Interview with El Hadji Merchant (insert interview source, and location) (May 4, 2018), supra note 263
(describing his speculative investment in peri-urban land outside Niamey).
285
Id.
286
Id.
287
Id.
288
It should be noted that there is another class of people, who will be mentioned only in this note, that both win and
lose as a result of the symbiotic relationship between major real estate developers and corrupt governmental
officials. They are civil servants of moderate means who are searching for housing in the vicinity of Niamey. They
are winners because the entry of private developers on the peri-urban scene has increased the number of houses and
house plots available for purchase. See Meyer, supra note 1 (arguing Niger’s efforts to create housing and financing
for civil servants has worked). They are losers because the resulting neighborhoods and houses are often poorly
planned and constructed; See also Issaka, supra note 1. Because the developers are in cahoots with the government
officials, they can maximize profits by making roads too narrow for fire trucks, eschewing drainage infrastructure,
and failing to reserve space for public utilities. Id. With regulators looking the other way, they also save money and
increase profits by constructing homes using substandard materials. Id.
289
See Kelley at note 8 & 9.
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opportunities to enhance their power and wealth.290 With peri-urban land in high demand and
ambiguity concerning which state actors have the power to convert land from farms to
suburbs, rural Nigeriens have turned to chiefs, who retain much of their customary authority
over land in spite of the state’s efforts to weaken it.291
Traditional chiefs’ approaches to peri-urban land transactions are as variable as those of the
state. Some village and canton chiefs expand their pocketbooks and their power by taking an
active role in facilitating the transfer of agricultural land to urban investors or developers.292 In a
typical transaction, a developer from the city will approach a traditional chief whose rural
domain is 20 or more kilometers from the edge of Niamey’s existing suburbs.293 The chief will
act as a broker, identifying a family patriarch willing to sell a large tract of family land;
sometimes with, sometimes without the extended family’s informed consent.294 The chief may
take a finder’s fee that includes cash or a percentage of the house lots to be developed.295 In
other instances, chiefs simply sell large tracts of undeveloped “chief’s lands” to investors even
though customarily they are guardians of that land and not owners.296
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See Janine M. Ubink, Courts and Peri-Urban Practice, supra note 194, at 28 (arguing in villages chiefs are major
actors in converting peri-urban land from agricultural to residential and that they often are the prime beneficiaries);
Benjaminsen, et.al., supra note 157, at 31 (arguing land shortages combined with increasing desire to formalize land
rights has provided a financial boon to traditional chiefs).
291
See COTULA ET. AL., supra note 168, at 12 (arguing land titling schemes in Africa did not work well, which
led to increases in chiefs’ power over land).
292
Interview with Retired Office Worker (April 28, 2018), See supra note 262 (recounting his purchase of plots of
land that were endorsed by canton chiefs).
293
Interview with Two Real Estate Developers (April 30, 2018), See supra note 262 (arguing their social housing
project, located approximately 30 kilometers outside Niamey, began with a purchase of land from farmers);
Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey Commune 5 (May 2, 2018), See also supra note 180 (arguing most periurban land sales begin when a buyer approaches the head of a family).
294
See Janine M. Ubink, Courts and Peri-Urban Practice, supra note 194, at 37 (arguing chiefs in Ghana sometimes
connive with family elders to sell land out from under the control of extended families).
295
Interview with Retired Office Worker (April 28, 2018), See supra note 262 (arguing that when land is
subdivided, the chiefs always get their cut and providing the example of Niamey’s Haro Banda neighborhood, where
20% of all the newly created plots were divided among chiefs and government officials); See also Motcho, supra
note 48, at 7 (arguing chiefs have become central actors in suburbanization and that they profit by, among other
things, receiving compensation in the form of parcels).
296
See Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 10, 27 (arguing under customary law chiefs are guardians of undeveloped
land, not owners); see also Interview with Canton Chief of Koure (May 3, 2018), supra note 100 (claiming –
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Even chiefs who do not take an active role in selling or developing peri-urban land

benefit from the transactions, at least in the short term. When investors or developers arrive in
the village and come to agreement with a family patriarch, the chief, for a fee, will create a
written document referred to as a detention coutumiere (customary holding).297 That document
represents the developer’s or investor’s first step in the long and tortuous process (one that is
simpler for the land development kingpins with political connections)298 of obtaining full,
individual ownership and registered title over the land.299 In theory, the chief investigates the
transaction before granting the detention coutumiere, ensuring that the seller has a legitimate
claim over the land and that the seller’s family, many of whom may claim primary or secondary
rights in land, approve of the sale.300 However, as described in Part V.B.1. below, the sales often
proceed without the extended family’s knowledge or acquiescence.

incorrectly – that in pre-colonial Niger all land “belonged” to canton chiefs and that in recent time some village
chiefs have claimed ownership of land, obtained title, and sold it to developers); Interview with a Highly Placed
Official in Niger’s Ministry of the Environment and of Durable Development (May 11, 2018), See The World
Factbook at note 20 (arguing village chiefs in Niger claim ownership of vast tracts and “profit personally from the
sales”); Ubink, Courts and Peri-Urban Practice, supra note 194, at 30 (arguing chiefs in Ghana wrongly claim they
have the right to displace individual users of land and either sell it or lease it to strangers); Joseph Blocher, Building
on Custom: Land Tenure Policy and Economic Development in Ghana, Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L. J. 166, 168-169
(2006) (note) (arguing chiefs sometimes sell land “out from under” users); COTULA, ET. AL., supra note 168, at
27 (arguing chiefs sell land they do not own).
It should be noted that at least some chiefs take a hard line against the sale of peri-urban land to outsiders.
For example, the chef de canton of Hamdallaye, a town a half-hour drive out the Fillingue Road from Niamey,
claims he has steadfastly refused to authorize sales of customary agricultural land to investors or developers.
Interview with Hamdallaye Canton Chief (May 1, 2018), supra note 17. He also uses his traditional authority and
prestige to prevent his subjects from circumventing his authority and seeking authorization from the local mayor’s
office. Id. However, this reluctance to permit land conversion appears not to be well grounded in formal law and
is the exception rather than the rule. See Interview with Canton Chief of Koure (May 3, 2018), supra note 100
(arguing that he lacks authority to prevent land sales); Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey Commune 5
(May 2, 2018), supra note 180 (arguing canton chiefs lack authority to block land sales, even in rural areas).
297
See Korling at note 1 (mentioning detention coutumere), (arguing chiefs often charge 5,000 FCFA to issue
certificates of sale for village land).
298
See generally Meyer, supra notes 20; see also Korling, supra note 20; Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey
Commune 5, supra note 180.
299
See Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 24 (describing the process of formalizing land).
300
Meyer, supra note 20, at 190. See generally Kelly, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8; Interview with Canton
Chief of Koure, supra note 100 (arguing chiefs preside over historical examinations to determine who has rights to
agricultural lands).
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Whether or not the chief thoroughly vets the land sale, he receives his fee and thus becomes a
short-term winner in the conversion of land from fields to suburbs.301
B. Losers
1. Immediate Losers: Secondary Rights Holders
When a land developer or speculator purchases a plot of agricultural land located in a
peri-urban area – usually from a family patriarch or chief 302 – the complicated customary
law bundle of nested, contingent, secondary rights that heretofore determined access to that
land303 instantaneously vanishes.304 Rural people who depend on secondary rights in land
find themselves with nothing.
Women in rural communities are a prime example.305 Among rural Nigeriens, women do
not customarily have the right to inherit or control agricultural land, however, this does not mean
that they entirely lack rights in the lands controlled by their fathers, husbands, or brothers.306 As
described above, women normally enjoy the right to enter land to harvest medicinal herbs,

301
See Meyer, supra note 20, at 190, 252 (arguing chiefs extract fees for approving land sales); Korling, supra note
20, at 125. Although the chiefs are “short-term” winners, one can speculate that their authority, which is practically
and spiritually rooted in the community’s lands, will wither as the chiefs convert the community land to individually
owned parcels. See generally Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8; Becker, supra note 104; SHIPTON, supra
note 8; Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra note 15.
302
See Ubink, Courts and Peri-Urban Practice, supra note 194 at 37 (arguing chiefs in Ghana sometimes connive
with family elders to sell land out from under the control of extended families); see also Interview with Former
Mayor of Niamey Commune 5, supra note 180; Korling, supra note 20, at 106 (arguing land sales on the edge of the
city usually start when a buyer approaches the head of a family).
303
See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 102, at 682; SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 309; Becker, supra note 104;
Chimhown & Woodhouse, supra note 104; Polavarapu, supra note 104; Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra
note 9, at 1007, 1015.
304
See Chimhowu & Woodhouse, supra note 104, at 347-8 (arguing land titling often extinguishes secondary
“safety-net” rights such as wood gathering); see also Ubink, Tenure Security, supra note 57, at 222 (arguing titling
schemes often ignore secondary rights holders); COTULA ET AL., supra note 168, at 18 (arguing land titling often
leads to loss of secondary rights by women and pastoralists); Polavarapu, supra note 104, at 114 (arguing that
“nested rights” disappear when land is turned into a commodity).
305
Polavarapu, supra note 104, at 99-100.
306
See Polavarapu, supra note 104, at 111 (describing women’s secondary land rights under pre-colonial customary
law in Botswana); see Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 682.
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collect straw, or plant a small garden.307 These rights in land are not merely at the sufferance of
their husbands and male relatives; they are part of a finely-honed, well understood cultural and
spiritual complex.308 If a male to denies or violate a woman’s customary rights, he will bring
shame on himself and his family, and the spirits tied to the land may sanction him.309
Later-born men can be frozen out when their older brothers or uncles sell the family
lands.310 As described in Part III. A., the family patriarch typically acts in the role of caretaker or
trustee for the extended family’s lands. 311 This means that a later-born man must seek the
patriarch’s approval before clearing or cultivating a new plot, but it does not mean that the
patriarch in any sense owns the family lands.312 However, if the patriarch sells the land to an
outsider, the land becomes governed by state law, not customary law. Thus, the later-born
man’s access rights suddenly disappear,313 whether or not the patriarch decides to share the
financial proceeds from the sale.314
Customary slaves – a group most Nigeriens prefer not to discuss315 – also lose their
culturally enforceable secondary rights in land when it is sold to developers or investors. It is
beyond the scope of this article to discuss the complicated bundle of Nigerien social categories
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Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 682.
See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 683; see also Hagberg, supra note 60, at 104 (arguing those
who attempt to sell lineage lands in rural Burkina Faso risk sanction from the spirit world).
309
See Hagberg, supra note 60, at 10 (arguing earth priests and elders regard the earth “as a divinity and fear that the
violation of rituals may endanger not merely the individual’s well-being but community life in general”).
310
See Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1007 (arguing younger men in Nigerien villages have
limited rights to land access and are subject to the demands of the greater group and village Elders).
311
See id.
312
See id.
313
See Chimhowu & Woodhouse, supra note 104, at 347-8; see also Ubink, Tenure Security, supra note 57, at 222;
COTULA ET AL., supra note 168, at 18; Polavarapu, supra note 104, at 114.
314
JIMU, supra note 2, at 363 (arguing some sellers of customary land spend the proceeds on frivolity).
315
See Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1012 (arguing Nigerien government officials deny that
slavery exists in Niger).
308
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inexactly lumped together under the English word “slave” or the French word esclave.316 It must
suffice to say that under Nigerien customary law, slaves have a culturally enforceable right to
demand of village founders the use of sufficient agricultural lands to feed themselves and their
families.317 In some villages, slave lineages have been cultivating tracts of land for generations,
land they do not control, but to which they have culturally enforceable access rights.318 Under
custom, a patriarch that unceremoniously ejected a slave from agricultural lands would bring
shame on his lineage.319 If, on the other hand, the patriarch sells the family land cultivated by
the slave, the culturally defined and enforceable rights described above simply vanish.320 Once
the transaction is complete, the legal context instantaneously morphs: customary law holds its
relevance and “ownership” instantaneously vests in the individual who holds the piece of paper
reflecting title.
2. Long Term Losers
a. Those Who Depend on Customary Land for Livelihoods
For secondary rights holders, the loss resulting from the legal conversion of land from
custom to formal state law are sudden and dramatic. For primary rights holders, the losses
become apparent over time.
Imagine, for example, a village patriarch in a peri-urban zone sells all or much of his
family’s ancestral lands to a developer or speculator. Assume he obtained some form of
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See id. at 1013-16.
See id. at 1017, 1022 (arguing Nigerian custom requires nobles to make agricultural land available to slave, but
in adopting western notions of land law, they can abandon this.)
318
See id. at 1034.
319
Id. at 1032.
320
Kelley, Unintended Consequences, supra note 9, at 1032.
317
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permission from the sale from all or most of the heads of household in his lineage, though that is
not always the case.321
Assume also that he receives a large amount of money in exchange for the land. I have
heard of one such transaction for which the purchaser paid the equivalent of $20,000322 - a
substantial fortune in a country where most people live off of less than two dollars per day.323
The money rarely lasts. In African locales, where peri-urban ancestral land is being sold to
developers, stories abound of patriarchs who spend the proceeds on la belle vie: drink, women,
and flashy possessions.324 In Niger, a country where most rural people profess and practice
Islam and live sober, acetic lives,325 the money may not go to alcohol and high living but
instead to satisfy the lineage’s pent-up demand for life’s necessities.326 Young men who have
delayed marriage because they lack money for a bride price payment require financial backing
from the patriarch.327 Family members living in grass huts require the construction of more
expensive banco houses with metal roofs.328 Linage members who have been making due
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See Blocher, supra note 296, at 168-9 (arguing chiefs in Ghana sometimes sell land out from under its rightful
users); see also Ubink, supra note 57, at 216 (similar); Bron-Saidatou, supra note 26, at 127 (arguing chiefs in Niger
do not own communal land but sometimes sell it without consultation).
322
Interview with Canton Chief of Koure, supra note 100 (arguing purchases of rural land in Koure, near Niamey,
sometimes amount to $10,000 or $20,000, a huge amount in Niger).
323
See Niger: Country Profile, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, available at
https://www.who.int/hac/crises/ner/background/profile/en (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (reporting that over 60% of
Niger’s population lives with less than $1 a day). See also Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015:
Niger, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 20, 2015), available at https://20092017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=252713 (last visited Sept. 27, 2019)
(reporting that in 2011, 48.2% of Niger’s population lived under the poverty income level of $1.70 a day).
324
See JIMU, supra note 2, at 38 (arguing most proceeds from land sales in Malawi are spent on “beer, prostitutes,
and pot,” and on general “conspicuous consumption”).
325
Kelley, Exporting Western Law to the Developing World, supra note 134. My characterization of Nigeriens
leading sober and ascetic lives is based on my years of experience and observation in rural communities there.
326
Interview with Canton Chief of Koure, supra note 100. See also Becker, supra note 104, at 120 (arguing some
sellers of ancestral land in Mali, a predominantly Muslim country, spend lavishly by giving gifts and offering their
friends rides in their new cars); JIMU, supra note 2, at 312-3 (arguing in Malawi land sales are often motivated by
practical financial concerns such as the payment of school fees, medical bills, bride-wealth payments, or tombstones
for dead relatives, though some of these justifications are “after-the-fact rationalizations.”)
327
Interview with Canton Chief of Koure, supra note 100.
328
I base this statement on personal knowledge of Nigerien friends who live in the U.S. and who send home
remittances so their relatives can switch from grass to banco.
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with donkey carts feel the urgent need for motorcycles.329 And, of course, the sale of
agricultural land means that the lineage’s ability to grow its own staple crops diminishes or
disappears, so they must purchase their grain at the market if they are to avoid starvation.330
The small fortune disappears quickly.331
When the money is gone, rural Nigeriens have no place else to turn. Niger has no
equivalent of mid-20th century Detroit or Chicago where former agricultural workers can
migrate to seek factory jobs.332 Even if such jobs existed, the former subsistence farmers
would have no relevant skills to offer, since the vast majority are illiterate.333 In short, when
the proceeds from the sale of ancestral lands run out, rural people will suffer.334
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Interview with Canton Chief of Koure, supra note 100.
See JIMU, supra note 2, at 71 (arguing that in Malawi the conversion of peri-urban land led to declines in food
production and increased poverty and insecurity for rural people).
331
Interview with a Highly Placed Official in Niger’s Ministry of the Environment and of Durable Development,
supra note 258 (arguing peasant farmers are “selling their patrimony” and that in many cases the money they receive
only lasts for months or years). It should be noted that counter-examples exist. There are instances where those
who sell their ancestral land invest wisely or start small businesses and prosper. JIMU, supra note 2, at 7 (arguing
some sellers of ancestral lands in Malawi use the proceeds to start a small business or obtain a commercial driving
license and prosper, though most spend the money quickly). Of the many Nigeriens I have interviewed over the
years, I have met one who prospered as a result of land sales. He was from the village of Goudel. Niger’s
government expropriated much of his family’s agricultural land over the decades. After the start of democratization
in the early 1990s, the government tried to compensate him and similarly situated Goudel farmers by granting them
a share of the undeveloped suburban house plots that had been carved out of their old fields. This man sold many of
those house plots and used the cash to buy a bar in Niamey. Over the following decades, the bar grew into a small
empire of bars, nightclubs, hotels, tourist businesses, transport, and real estate holdings. However, as the text
indicates, such economic success stories are the exception, not the rule.
332
See SHIPTON, supra, note 8, at 144 (arguing Kenya lacked the industry to create jobs for people made landless by
land titling; see also JIMU, supra note 2, at 7 (arguing wage jobs were not available for Malawi citizens rendered
landless).
333
The World Factbook (Niger), U.S. Cent. Intelligence Agency, available at https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (reporting 19.1% of
Nigeriens over the age of 15 are literate).
334
Interview with Canton Chief of Koure, supra note 100 (arguing Nigerien farmers who well their land “end up
poor”); Interview with Former Mayor of Niamey’s Central Government, in Niamey, Niger (May 11, 2018 (arguing
proceeds of rural land sale go for weddings, trips, and motorcycles, and “then they’re left with nothing—they
become beggars and thieves”); Interview with Judge, in Niamey, Niger (May 9, 2018 (arguing after rural land sales
in Niger, “pretty soon the money is gone and they [the farmers] starve”). See also Jimu, supra note 2, at 338
(arguing land sellers in Malawi who cannot find wage labor end up destitute); Falk, supra note 171, at 1 (arguing
that in African contexts landlessness is synonymous with poverty).
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b. Those Who Define Themselves, Their Communities, Their
History, and Their Religion with Reference to Ancestral Land
For rural people in peri-urban Niger, hunger is not the only consequence of land sales

because land represents more than just a means of food production.335 The legal
transformation of ancestral land into a salable commodity – in effect converting land into
money336 – effaces the historical, cultural, and spiritual legacy that until now had given shape
and strength to rural Nigerien communities.337
Rural Nigeriens may be desperately poor by international standards,338 but overall,
they lead lives of honor and purpose.339 They take pride in offering food and shelter to
travelers.340

If a stranger wants to extend their stay in the village, the village chief or other

lineage heads will accord him access to enough land to feed himself and his family.341
Villagers look after one another, periodically gathering together to cultivate and harvest the
fields of sick or recently deceased members of the community or to build huts for newlywed
couples.342 Respect for age is common.343 Theft is rare.344 Rural Nigeriens generally live in
peace, mediating their differences in ways that Americans should emulate: they gather in
public, talk things through, and endeavor to find compromise, a modus vivendi that permits
them to navigate the difficult business of living together amidst some of the harshest
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See supra Part III.A
Interview with Former Gamkalle Resident and His Friend, supra note 208; Interview with Former Mayor of
Niamey’s Central Government, supra note 334.
337
See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 667, 710, n. 135; see also SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 14.
338
See Human Development Reports, supra note 19; The World Factbook (Niger), supra note 19.
339
Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 667.
340
See id. (arguing visitors to Nigerien villages “are plied with food and gifts”).
341
See id. at 666 (describing a family making agricultural land available to an outsider who wished to settle in the
village).
342
See id. (arguing in the Zarma language of Niger, the word bogu describes communal labor, often undertaken on
behalf of a villager in need and is the rough equivalent of “barn raising” in English).
343
Id. at 667; see also SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 14 (arguing respect for age is common among the Luo people of
Kenya).
344
Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 673.
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geographic and climatic conditions on earth.345
These positive attributes of Nigerien rural society arise out of an undivided complex of
spiritual, historical, and cultural beliefs in which land, including individuals’ rights in and
obligations toward land, is a central tenet.346 Land gives shape to rural peoples’ identities and
sense of self.347 Even considering the recent increase of Islamic influence, most rural
Nigeriens believe their ancestors made pacts with the spirits who control the land and that
those spirits, along with the spirits of their ancestors continue to watch over the decisions and
actions villagers take.348 A young man in the village avoids unruly behavior because he has
been raised that way, but also because he does not want to be the one to spark the spirits’
wrath and thereby diminishes the village’s barka.349 He accepts his father’s or uncle’s
decisions about which plot of land to cultivate, and about when he can begin cultivating for
his own rather than the extended family’s account, because to object, to rebel, would injure
not only his family but would insult the original land spirits and the spirits of his ancestors.350
That same young man, once his elders have accorded him a portion of the family land for
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See id. at 710. I am fully aware that depicting rural life in Niger in this way risks sparking the ire of scholars who
condemn as simplistic the colonial and post-colonial thesis that rural Africans live in harmony with themselves and
nature. See generally Mark Davidheiser, Harmony, Peacemaking, and Power: Controlling Processes and African
Mediation, 23 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 281, 282-6 (2006) (summarizing various critiques of the “harmony thesis”).
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See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 704 (arguing land is a key element in maintaining village
harmony); see also Becker, supra note 104, at 115 (arguing customary land helps “define cultural identity through
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See Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 647-8.
349
Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 704; see also Hagberg, supra note 60, at 99 (arguing village leaders
in Burkina Faso consider the land “as a divinity and fear that the violation of rituals may endanger not merely the
individual’s well-being but community life in general”).
350
Kelley, Squeezing Parakeets, supra note 8, at 704; JIMU, supra note 2, at 8 (arguing land is a symbolic medium
through which living people connect with their ancestors and their traditions); Blocher supra note 296, at 174
(arguing trust and honor can play a vital role in consistent land practices leading to stability and efficiency).
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cultivation, will avoid waste and certainly avoid sale, because he understands that interest in
the land is shared not only by his living relations, but by those who lived before and those
members of the family and community yet unborn.351
When land is titled and sold out of the community, those beliefs that tie together history,
spirituality and law disappear.352 If the spirits and their influence are displaced by a legal title
– a piece of paper filed in a distant town saying an outsider now owns the property – that
young man can take his proceeds, (assuming he is not struck by lightning or otherwise quickly
felled by illness or other misfortune)353 and ignore concerns about the ancestors’ wrath.354 He
can disregard the wishes of his father, his lineage head, and his village chief, because they no
longer have influence over his and his children’s future access to land.355 That issue will be
decided not by village elders, but by who can decode the foreign, formal legal process, obtain
the necessary piece of paper and properly register it in the distant cadaster.
In sum, land is an essential aspect of the social, spiritual, historical and legal complex that
provides structure and meaning to rural Nigerien communities. Removing land from this
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352
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at 115 (arguing “Where land is not a commodity, its non-market values define cultural identity through social
relations. When and where land sales occur marks a fundamental agrarian change that breaks cultural ties to the
land…”).
353
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354
Becker, supra note 104, at 121 (arguing in Mali, land sales are leading to a decline in cooperative spirit of the
ethnic group’s values). See also Ubink, supra note 57, at 223 (arguing studies of peri-urban land sales show
abundant evidence of high social cost, especially for the poor).
355
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peri- urban Mali contribute to “a decline in the cooperative spirit of the ethnic group’s values” that will “radically
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complex will profoundly disrupt a system that has permitted Nigeriens to persevere for many
generations amidst extraordinarily difficult conditions.356

356
See Becker, supra note 104, at 115 (arguing land conversion creates “new territories with new boundaries, new
rules and new authorities claiming new legitimacy to control access” leading to “a profound transformation of
society”); SHIPTON, supra note 8, at 128-29 (arguing land titling in Kenya threatens to upset the deeply rooted
land-related traditions and may lead to social disruption).
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